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Abstract 
This paper argues that, in light of the prevalence of administrative policies, the 
normative force they carry and the reliance placed upon them by the public, there is a 
need for the courts to develop the law regulating the way that administrators use policy 
to structure and guide the exercise of their statutory discretions. It will be argued that 
such developments would give effect to both the ‘controlling’ and the ‘facilitating’ 
objectives that underpin administrative law, and, would strike an appropriate balance 
between the competing values at play so as to foster good governance. First, the nature 
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of administrative policies, their rise as a regulatory tool of government and the growing 
administrative preference for policy over delegated legislation are explored. It is argued 
that there is a necessity for the courts to develop the law regulating the administrative 
use of policy to foster the democratic principle of accountability.  The current legal 
principles regulating the use of administrative policies in a discretionary context, under 
the broad banner of the ‘fettering by rigidity principle’ are explored and assessed. It is 
argued that the fettering by rigidity principle has been applied in a nuanced and 
variable way, and that it plays an important role in fostering good governance, 
particularly by promoting flexibility, responsiveness and participation, but does not go 
far enough in promoting the values of certainty, fairness and consistency.  It is argued 
that a more appropriate balance between these values could be struck by developing a 
duty for administrators to apply policy consistently and only to depart for good reasons. 
Finally, it is argued that the principle of legitimate expectations should be developed to 
allow for substantive protection where an administrator unjustifiably frustrates the trust 
and reliance which individuals may have placed in an existing policy where that policy 
is subsequently replaced by a new one.  
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JUDICIAL REGULATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES THAT 
INFLUENCE THE EXERCISE OF STATUTORY DISCRETIONS 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
'The universe maintained a balance, moving first one way and then the other in 
a forever equalizing of opposites.' - Diana Lanham 
Lawyers tend to maintain a bright line between law and policy. However, over 
the past century there has been a growing politicization of the law which has gone hand 
in hand with the proliferation of administrative policy-making to guide the exercise of 
statutory discretions. Many lawyers when faced with such administrative policies will 
respond that they are not law and, therefore, are not binding. Administrators may give a 
similar response.  
At a formal level, this statement is correct. However, it conceals far more than it 
reveals and it elides the reality that, in practice, such policies often carry the normative 
force of laws within the context of administrative decision-making. Confronted with this 
reality the question is what can courts do to guide administrators in striking an 
appropriate balance between flexibility and certainty; between the attainment of public 
purposes and the need to treat individuals with respect? It is, arguably, only through the 
development of principles that recognise the significance of the role that policy plays in 
the modern South African regulatory context and the influence it exerts, that courts can 
begin to develop principles to guide administrators and hold them accountable for the 
way in which policy is applied. 
Part 2 explains the relationship between discretion and policy. It demonstrates 
that policy has become prevalent throughout almost all fields of administrative 
regulation and exercises a significant influence over the exercise of statutory discretions 
and often functions in a manner similar to subordinate legislation. I argue that the courts 
have an important role to play in both facilitating and controlling the exercise of 
government power, and, in particular, to ensure that certain good governance values, 
that are fundamental to the Constitution, underpin administrative decision-making, 




of administrative decision-making to give effect to these values and to hold the 
administration accountable to them. In applying these principles courts have regard to 
the legitimate role and purposes of the administration. 
Part 3 explores the current state of the administrative-law principles, primarily 
the fettering-by-rigidity principle, which regulate the use of policies that have a non-
trivial influence on the exercise of statutory discretions. This part demonstrates that 
courts have developed the fettering-by-rigidity principle in nuanced ways in recognition 
of the need to strike a balance between flexibility and certainty, and in particular that the 
principle plays a significant role in fostering participation in decisions governed by 
policy. However, from this exploration it is apparent that courts have not yet done 
enough to formulate principles to guide administrators so that the use of policy in 
decision-making is wise and humane and shows respect for individuals, and to hold the 
administration to account for the way it uses policy.  
Part 4 argues that the courts should develop a principle that obliges administrators 
to apply their policies consistently unless there is good reason for departure. Such a 
development would be consistent with important constitutional values and would 
function as a logical development of the nuanced way the fettering-by-rigidity principle 
has been applied by courts. It would also serve an important function in holding the 
administration to account for the way that it applies its policies. 
Part 5 argues that the courts should develop the principle of substantive legitimate 
expectations, in very limited circumstances, where an administrator unjustifiably 
frustrates the trust and reliance which individuals have placed in an existing policy when 





2. THE CASE FOR NEW PRINCIPLES ABOUT POLICY 
2.1. The need for policy 
The 20
th
 century saw the demise of the night-watchman state, predicated on 
liberal individualist values, and the birth of state interventionism, rooted firmly in 
collectivism.
1
  In the night-watchman state, state interference in the private actions of 
individuals was limited and mediated through settled rules aimed primarily at preventing 
interference with individual liberties.
2
 The autonomy and privacy of individuals had 
primacy and was protected through legal rights.
3
 However, as a result of the myriad 





 centuries, societies came to believe that they could take control of their collective 
destinies through central planning of social and economic activities; people embraced 
the idea that rather than just regulating society ‘government should seek to improve it’
4
 
and confer ‘benefit on the mass of people’.
5
 Thus, governments began to pursue social 
welfare goals and took a more interventionist approach to maintaining social order than 
they had previously.  
As a result of changes to the role of the state, society could no longer be 
regulated through formal mechanical rules and the common law alone.
6
 First, the sheer 
magnitude of the task of regulating all the facets of modern societies for the common 
good is daunting and complex. The factors relevant to decision-making may be so 
numerous and varied that it would be impossible to foresee them in advance. In other 
cases, the factors and standards relevant to decision-making may best be determined 
through the expertise of a functionally-specialised administrator.
7 
Second, the complex 
and variable nature of collectivist regulation would in certain circumstances make the 
                                                           
1  See Harlow, C and Rawlings, R Law and Administration 3ed (2009) at 1-8; Baxter Administrative Law (1984) part 
2. 
2 See Harlow (n 1) at 5 and Galligan, DJ Discretionary Powers: A Legal Study of Official Discretion (1986) at 86 – 
88. 
3 Galligan (n 2) at 87. 
4 Harlow (n 1) at 2. 
5 Baxter, L ‘Legal Education and Public Policy’ 1 Natal University Law & Society Review at 15 – 16. 
6 Sedley, S ‘Policy and Law’ in Andenas, M and Fairgrieve, D (eds) Judicial Review in International Perspective 
(2000) at 265. 
7 Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others; Shalabi and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and 
Others; Thomas and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2000 (8) BCLR 837 (CC) at para 53 and see also 




generalisations that are characteristic of rules inappropriate (particularly where the 
situations encountered are so variable that generalisations are impossible).
8
 The job of 
the administrator is to achieve the political purposes for which the power was granted as 
effectively as possible (not just to apply a set of given rules formally and impartially), 
which creates a broad tendency towards more individualised decision-making.
9
  
Consequently, it became necessary to confer discretion on administrators so that 
abstract and general legal standards could be applied to particular circumstances in a fair 
manner and adapted to changing social realities.
10
   Administrators were given broad 
powers where they, rather than the legislature, were largely responsible for determining 
standards according to which the power was to be exercised, because the circumstances 
necessitated greater freedom in exercising the powers than rules, which limit the factors 
to be taken into account, would ordinarily permit.
11
  However, this is not to say that 
discretion connotes an unbounded, freewheeling power to be exercised according to the 
personal dictates or whim of the administrator upon whom the power is conferred. As 
Dworkin has noted, discretion is like a hole in a doughnut.
12
 It is always constituted and 
constrained by a surrounding belt of rules. It is a choice of options that is available 
within statutorily-defined boundaries and it must be exercised in a manner that is 
rationally connected to the purposes for which the power has been granted. The grant of 
discretion will provide varying degrees of guidance as to the policy goals to be achieved 
and the standards by which they are to be achieved. Thus, depending on how it is 
conferred, the breadth of discretion may be wider or narrower. 
Lawyers, under the influence of Dicey
13
, have traditionally been suspicious of 
discretion which, by granting flexibility to decision-makers, reduces certainty and 
predictability, potentially opening the door to arbitrary and unfair actions affecting the 
                                                           
8 Galligan (n 2) at 131. 
9 Galligan (n 2) at 69. 
10 This is what Galligan refers to as discretion in the ‘central sense’. Discretion may also arise in finding facts, 
applying standards to facts or filling an interpretive gap. 
11 Galligan (n 2) at 2-3. 
12 Dworkin, R Is Law a System of Rules in The Philosophy of Law (1977) 52 
13  Dicey’s theory of constitutional law was grounded in his belief in limited government and a negative conception of 
liberty. He feared collectivism and saw it as  a threat to the values he had identified as core to constitutionalism. As 
the administration (primarily through discretionary powers) was the primary means for implementing collectivism he 
was deeply mistrustful of the administration. Through broad grants of discretionary power the administration also 
came to perform adjudicative and legislative functions which Dicey viewed as a threat to the legislature and the 






  While it is widely-accepted that ‘discretion plays a crucial role in any legal 
system,’
15
  there remains a need to structure it: to provide certainty and consistency, and 
to guide officials in their decision-making.
16
 The primary means that has emerged to 
achieve these goals is policy: 
[policy] possesses virtues of flexibility which legal rules lack, and virtues of 
consistency which simple discretion lacks. If the first of these virtues … offers 




2.2. The nature of policy 
O’ Regan has referred to policy as ‘a course of action adopted or pursued by a 
government.’
18
  The American Heritage Dictionary defines it as 'a plan or course of 
action, as of a government, political party, or business, intended to influence and 
determine decisions, actions and other matters'. What is apparent from these definitions 
is that, by its very nature, policy is intended to be applied consistently so as to influence 
the outcomes of decisions or actions in particular areas.  Policy is generally expressed in 
the form of standards.
19
 Standards vary – at one end of the spectrum there are broad 
abstract standards that grant a wide degree of discretion and at the other end there are 
precise standards that take the form of rules. These policy standards may be 
encapsulated in primary legislation, subordinate regulations, or they may take the form 
of guidelines and instructions to the administration or, in certain circumstances, may not 
be made express but may be pursued through the conduct of officials.
20
 
In the government context, policy is generally collectivist in nature, focusing on 
the collective interests of citizens (e.g. maintaining social order and advancing social 
welfare) rather than individual interests. Policy serves to facilitate the implementation of 
public programmes designed to regulate some form of human activity, provide some 
                                                           
14 Discretion is no longer thought of in Diceyan terms as necessarily leading to arbitrariness. 
15 Dawood (n 7) para 53 and footnote 73. 
16 Ibid. The courts’ conclusions are informed by the work of K. C. Davis. Davis was of the view that ‘the degree of 
administrative discretion should often be more restricted; some of the restricting can be done by legislators but most 
of the task must be performed by administrators’. 
17 Sedley ( n 6) at 265. 
18 O Regan, C ‘A forum for reason: Reflections on the role and work of the Constitutional Court’ Discourse and 
debate: Helen Suzman memorial lecture 2012 28 SAJHR 116 at 126 
19  See generally Galligan (n 2) at 1-14.  




service, or execute some plan of public action. It is the active pursuit of community 
goals and thus is often referred to as ‘the purposive activity of government’.
21
 It can be 
formulated in a rationalist manner, where the policy sets out in advance the measures 
that are intended to be used to achieve the predefined objectives, or an incremental 
manner, where the policy is formulated in an evolutionary and experimental way, taking 
into account the interests of those affected, and continuously adjusted in light of 
accumulated experience.
22
 Most policy formulation involves a combination of both 
rationalist and incremental methods in variable relationships with one another, 
depending on the context.
23
 Further, over time there are usually good reasons, in the 
interest of certainty, guidance and accountability, for the standards that have developed 
through the incremental determination of various matters to be formalised in a more 
comprehensive manner. 
This paper focuses on policy in the form of instructions or guidelines that are 
made by the executive and administration, rather than primary or subordinate 
legislation. The formulation of policy in this sense is closely linked to the grant of 
discretion to administrators and is a mechanism through which discretion is structured. 
In other words, there is no stark choice between rules and discretion. Discretion will 
always be directed at achieving goals and from those goals it will be possible to derive 
some standards to guide decision-making, which may be more or less precise: pointing 
at some direct outcome or merely specifying factors to be taken into account.
24
  
Importantly, the extrapolation of such standards from purposes is a minimum 
requirement if decision-making is to be rational. It is also a mistake to think that there is 
something inherent in the nature of discretion that precludes it from being translated into 
precise standards.
25
 One of the reasons to confer discretion is to allow a functionally-
specialised administrator with relevant expertise to determine how best to regulate the 
situation and achieve the statutory purposes, and in certain circumstances the best way 
                                                           
21 Baxter (n 5) at 16. 
22 Galligan (n 2) 162 - 165 and Baxter (n 5) at 17. 
23   As Galligan notes, there is a complex relationship between rational purposive decision-making and general 
standards. The configuration of standards and openness, and planning an incrementalism is complex and variable. 
Policy formulation consists of a blend of both.  
24 Galligan (n 2) at 9. 




to do that will be to formulate standards with the precision of rules.
26
 So discretion 
effectively means that the power to fix the standards for decision making is granted to 
the administrator. It does not mean that there are no standards.
27
 
How tightly or loosely those standards are framed must be determined in a 
particular context. The nature of decisions that administrators are faced with varies 
considerably. Here, too, there is a spectrum. On the one hand, are decisions, that are 
unlikely to recur, involving the formulation of general standards with a high policy 
content, affecting a wide range of interests and requiring the consideration of a number 
of different factors that may be in tension with each other.
28
 On the other, are decisions 
that more closely resemble adjudication, involving the more individualised 
determination of how a person or a situation should be treated.
29
 In the latter type of 
decisions, the range of interests affected is generally limited to those parties before the 
decision-maker (with perhaps a minor indirect impact on a limited group of others).  The 
policy factors that influence the decision are either simple or have been settled in 
advance of the decision and the circumstances in which the decisions occur differ only 
in marginal ways. The closer the decision is to the ‘high policy content type’ the looser 
and more flexible the standards for decision-making are likely to be, whereas the closer 
the decision is to the adjudicative type the more appropriate it becomes to make 
decisions based on more precise rule-like standards coupled with the power to depart in 
exceptional or unforeseen circumstances. A significant proportion of administrative 
decision-making leans towards adjudicative decision-making.  
Thus, the type of policies that are of concern in this paper are those which are 
intended to exert a significant influence on the exercise of statutory discretions granted 
to administrators. This has two important implications.   First, the primary focus is on 
those policies that tend toward specificity and prescriptiveness and those that contain 
written norms or criteria made by the administration which do not have legislative 
pedigree but have the purpose or effect of influencing administrative decision-making in 
                                                           
26 Galligan (n 2) at 22. 
27 Galligan (n 2) at 1. 







 In other jurisdictions such policies are referred to as ‘soft law’, 
‘grey letter law’, ‘fuzzy law’ or ‘quasi legislation’.  
Second, the focus on policies which guide the exercise of statutory discretions in 
adjudicative situations means the nature of the policy formulation being considered is 
what O’ Regan J referred to in Permanent Secretary of the Department of Education of 
the Government of the Eastern Cape Province and Another v Ed-U-College
31
 as policy 
formulation ‘in the narrower sense:'  
Policy may be formulated by the executive outside of a legislative framework. 
For example, the executive may determine a policy on road and rail 
transportation, or on tertiary education. The formulation of such policy involves 
a political decision … However, policy may also be formulated in a narrower 
sense where a member of the executive is implementing legislation. 
The formulation of policy in this narrower sense will often constitute 
administrative action and thus be subject to the requirements of the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act, 3 of 2000 (“PAJA”).
32
 
All further references to ‘policy’ in this paper will relate to policy in the sense described 
above unless otherwise specified. 
2.3. The prevalence and influence of policy 
Policy exerts a significant influence on administrative decision-making and the 
behaviour of individuals. This is so, first, because as government regulation has 
increased to meet the growing demands of modern societies, there been a concomitant 
mushrooming of policies to guide administrative decision-making – this is because 
rationality requires that there should be at least some standards to inform decision-
making. The regulation of land-use planning, environment, fishing, public procurement, 
property, tax, broad based black economic empowerment, companies, labour, 
immigration, social security, energy and natural resources bristles with policies in a 
myriad of forms including guidelines, circulars, memoranda, instructions and directives. 
                                                           
30 Sossin, L and Smith, C “Hard choices and soft law: ethical codes, policy guidelines and the role of courts in 
regulating government” 40 Alta. L. Rev. 867 2002 – 2003 at 871. 
31 Permanent Secretary of the Department of Education of the Government of the Eastern Cape Province and Another 
v Ed-U-College 2001 (2) SA 1 (CC) para 18. 




This is true not only in South Africa, but world-wide. An Australian study on business 
and regulation revealed that as early as 1997 there were more than 30 000 policies 
concerning business regulation alone.
33
 It appears unlikely that there will be a 




Second, policy is a source of guidance not only to decision-makers but also to 
individuals. It is ‘now a major source of people’s expectations of how government will 
treat them’.
35
 Many individuals and companies plan their activities in accordance with 
government policy, since in the modern world, in which broad grants of discretion are 
made to administrators, policy fulfils the guiding role that laws themselves are supposed 
to perform.  
Third, decision-makers tend to treat policy in the same way as regulations or 
legislation.
36
 In certain contexts, studies have found that decision-makers rely almost 
exclusively on policy and rarely use legislation or regulations in their decision-making.
37
 
It has become the ‘principle administrative mechanism used to elaborate the legal 
standards and political and other values underlying bureaucratic decision-making’,
38
 
particularly in view of the ‘discernible retreat from primary legislation in favour of 
government by informal rules.’
39
 
2.4. The preference for policy rather than regulations 
Policy is attractive to the administration primarily for reasons of ease, expediency 
and pragmatism. Studies from around the world indicate that administrators view policy 
as a user- friendly and comprehensive source of guidance, whereas they view legislation 
                                                           
33 Creyke, R “’Soft law’ and administrative law: a new challenge”  ALAL Forum no 61 at 17 However it is important 
to note that the 30 000 policies include subordinate legislation. 
34See generally Sossin (n 30) and Creyke (n 33). 
35 Sedley (n 6) at 262. 
36 Pottie, L and Sossin, L ‘Demystifying the Boundaries of Public Law: Policy, Discretion and Social Welfare’ 38  
U.B.C.L. Rev. 147 2005 at 149. See too Harlow (n 1) at 41. 
37 Pottie (n 36) at 152.  
38 Creyke, R (n 33) at 17.  
39 Baldwin, R and Houghton, ‘Circular arguments: The status and legitimacy of administrative rules 1986 Public Law 
239. See also Harlow (n 1) at 192: administrative rule-making is 'the most important way in which the bureaucracy 





and regulations as intimidating and find them difficult to read and interpret.
40
 A key 
aspect of policy, therefore, is its flexibility: it is not binding in the way that rule-based 
regulations are, operating in an all-or-nothing fashion, but it instead allows for justice to 
be done in the circumstances of a particular adjudication. 
Policy is also attractive because it can be made without the delay and complexity 
of legislation.
41
 It is inexpensive compared to the drafting of legislation and regulations, 
swiftly structures discretion to achieve the purposes for which it was given, and is easy 
to change in an incremental fashion as and when necessary.
42
 Thus policy is a useful 
way to test and experiment with principles that are not yet ripe for precise articulation in 
regulations and may be used to structure discretion where there is no power to enact 
regulations.  
However, many legal academics have expressed concern that the line between 
policy and ‘extra-statutory regulation’ may be narrow and sometimes difficult to draw.
43
  
What seems to underlie this concern is the unease that, while policy will often have an 
effect similar to regulations, it may not be subject to the same requirements of 
procedural fairness in its formulation; it may not be accessible to the public; it is not 
subject to a common set of standards as to form and presentation; it may be prepared by 
lay people rather than legislative drafters, resulting in 'unclear' or 'conflicting' policies; 
and, most alarmingly to lawyers, it may be used to subvert the law and extend the 
powers of the administration without the concurrence of the legislature, thus 
undermining the rule of law and separation of powers.
44
 
These concerns, at least in so far as policy is being compared unfavourably with 
regulations, may be overstated. As Baxter and O’ Regan have pointed out, there 
certainly is a need to increase participation, responsiveness and accountability in 
                                                           
40 Pottie  (n 36) at 154. 
41 Creyke (n 33) at 17 
42 Creyke, R and McMillan , J “ Soft law v Hard Law ” in Administrative law in a changing State: Essays in honour of 
Mark Aronson, Pearson, Harlow Taggart (eds) 388 – 389.  
43  Galligan notes that this is not entirely satisfactory because the distinction between legislating and guidelines is not 
compelling because both may constitute legislating in some sense and the differences are a matter of subtle emphasis. 
Harlow and Rawlings also note that rules are not always strict and binding and as has been seen can incorporate 
discretion can be open textured and operate at the level of principles. Thus flexibility is not the sole preserve of policy 
and rigidity is not the sole preserve of rules. There is no bright line.  
44Pottie (n36); Creyke (n 42) at 389; Molot, H.L ‘The self created rule of policy and other ways of exercising 




administrative rule-making, since administrative rules are made by administrative 
officials who are not directly accountable to the public, rather than by the legislature 
which is politically accountable.
45
 However, this concern applies equally to regulations 
and policy, since the legal standards of procedural fairness for each are similar.
46
 In 
terms of the Constitution, regulations must be accessible to the public and national 
legislation may specify the manner and extent to which regulations must be tabled and 
approved by Parliament.
47
 Accordingly, regulations are published in the Government 
Gazette. Yet legislation rarely requires regulations to be tabled in or approved by 
Parliament. Admittedly, there are no similar requirements for policy. Nevertheless, most 
government departments have developed a practice of making their policies available on 
their websites and/or of distributing them to stakeholders on their data bases via e-mail. 
Thus, although the legal standard for accessibility of policies and regulations differs, in 
practice the variance in their accessibility is not as pronounced as may be assumed.
48
 
The preference for legislative drafting is, arguably, a lawyer’s bias. As mentioned 
above, both administrators and the public generally find legislation intimidating and 
difficult to follow and, while there is undoubtedly value in the precision and formal 
structures of legislative drafting, they do not guarantee clarity and coherence. In the 
context of the drafting of standards, norms and criteria by the administration, there is 
arguably value in formulating such documents in plain language that is accessible and 
clear to both the administrators who will use them and the public.   
Finally, in response to the separation of powers and rule of law concerns, it is 
worth noting that policy, in the sense used in this paper, is prepared primarily to guide 
the exercise of statutory discretions. Like regulations, policy helps to flesh out the broad 
grants of power conferred in primary legislation. In the absence of statutory 
authorisation, administrators cannot exercise plenary legislative powers through policy; 
                                                           
45 See generally Baxter,L ‘Rule-making and Policy Formulation in South African Administrative-law Reform’ (1993)  
Acta Juridica 176 and O'Regan, C Rules for Rule-Making: Administrative Law and Subordinate Legislation 1993 
Acta Juridica 157. 
46
 Regulations and policy (in the narrower sense) are both likely to constitute administrative action and are thus both 
subject to the procedural fairness requirements in PAJA. In relation to policy see  Ed-U-College  (n31) para 18 and in 
relation to regulations see South African Dental Association v Minister of Health (20556/2014) [2015] ZASCA 163 
para 41. 
47 Sub-sections 101(3) and 101(4) of the Constitution.  
48 In relation to the need for improved rules for rule-making in the policy context see generally Sossin (n 30) and 




the powers they exercise are akin to subordinate regulatory authority within the 
framework of primary legislation. Should the policy exceed the bounds of the 
discretionary power conferred on the administrator through primary legislation, the 




The complaint that it is inappropriate for administrators to exercise powers 
similar to delegated legislation through policy, particularly where the power has not 
been expressly delegated by the legislature, is one of form rather than substance. The 
executive and the administration are responsible for preparing and initiating legislation 
and, as such, could readily empower themselves to make policies through primary 
legislation, and regularly do so, and it is doubtful that the legislature would object. Both 
the legislature and the courts are aware, at least peripherally, of the growing trend 
towards policy-making and, indeed, the courts, who are the guardians of the rule of law 
and the separation of powers, have recognised the usefulness of policy and accepted that 
it may be formulated even where the legislature has not expressly empowered the 
administration to do so.
50
 
Although there is, arguably, scope to improve the standardisation, drafting and 
accessibility of policies, the courts have found the formulation and use of policy legally 




 – and it will undoubtedly remain a 
key element of regulation for the foreseeable future.  
2.5. Judicial engagement with policy 
As is apparent from the above, administrative officials often treat policy no 
differently from legislation or regulations, whereas courts have tended to see a bright 
line between policy and law, between the province of the administration and the 
province of the judiciary.
53
 Unsurprisingly, courts prefer to focus their attention on the 
                                                           
49 See Part 3 below where this is discussed in more detail. 
50 Winckler and Others v Minister of Correctional Services and Others 2001 (2) SA 747 (CPD) at 754 B and C and 
the further discussion of this point in Part 3. 
51 Britten v Pope 1916 AD 150 at 158. 
52 BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land Affairs 2004 (5) SA 
124 (W) at 155A-B and MEC for Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land Affairs, Gauteng v Sasol Oil and 
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law. But, there is a risk that adjudication will become unduly formalistic if there is 
excessive focus on the source of the power, rather than its substance. The consequence 
may be to remove a key basis for executive and administrative accountability for the 
exercise of discretion. 
How, then, should judges react to the prevalent use of policy by administrators in 
ways that frequently resemble the application of subsidiary legislation? A principled 
answer to this question is dependent upon answering two further, more primary, 
theoretical questions: what does administrative law seek to accomplish and how does it 
seek to accomplish it?
54
 The answers to these questions will determine the broader 
‘stance of administrative law vis a vis public power’.
55
  The Constitution arguably 
contemplates two primary objectives for administrative law. 
The first objective, which arose from and has become firmly established as a 
result of the Diceyan theory of the rule of law,
56
 is controlling and constraining the 
administration. Control and constraint of administrative power protects individuals from 
abuses of power by a disproportionately powerful administration, and ensures that the 
administration does not stray beyond the bounds of power that the democratically 
elected legislature has granted to it. In this way administrative law is framed as a 
negative constraint on power, telling administrators what they may not do.
57
 It is rooted 
in a deep mistrust of the administration.
58





 in nature in that it culminates in courts scrutinising and diagnosing 
                                                           
54 In Proportionality and Legitimate Expectations in Administrative Law (2000), Thomas phrases the same question in 
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55 Farina, CR ‘Administrative law as regulation: the paradox of attempting to control and to inspire the use of public 
power’ (2004) 19 SAPL 489 at 489. Farina conceptualizes administrative law as 'the regulation of regulation'. 
56 Dicey’s legacy was to leave lawyers with a distrust of administrative action and in particular the exercise of 
discretionary power. He believed that the administration was capable of arbitrarily encroaching on the rights of 
individuals and should be controlled. A significant failing was that Dicey’s theory of constitutional law, and 
particularly his conception of the state left the courts without any theoretic basis to exercise control over the 
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as policing and controlling the administration to keep it within the bounds of the laws promulgated by the sovereign 
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57 The broad list of prohibited conduct, amounting to reviewable irregularities, is set out in section 6 of PAJA. 
58 In addition, at least historically, it was rooted not only in a mistrust that the human frailty of administrators clothed 
with broad regulatory powers will lead to abuse but also in the entire project of the administrative state. 
59 Farina (n 56) at 503. 




past improper conduct and, where appropriate, setting aside, correcting or granting 
another appropriate remedy. However, as Tomkins point out:  
Administrative law should seek not merely to stop bad administrative practice … 
the goal [is] to enhance individual and collective liberty conceived in positive 
and not just negative terms.
61
 
The second, more positive, objective is facilitating the accomplishment of public 
purposes the administration was created to perform. This objective implies a 
fundamental transformation of the attitudes and assumptions that underpinned the 
Diceyan view of the administration. Our constitutional arrangements reflect the 
democratic choice we have made in favour of centralised government regulation as a 
means to improve our social and economic circumstances. Accordingly, administrative 
lawyers and judges must accept that the law may be used ‘constructively as a means of 
not just controlling the state, but guiding it to achieve the legitimate purposes it 
pursues’.
62
   
‘Facilitating’ implies that the law also has a proactive role in positively shaping 
the normative framework for administrative decision-making to foster governance that is 
not only effective in achieving social goals but is also ‘good’.
63
 This second sense of 
‘facilitating’ is, perhaps, for some more closely associated with ‘controlling’ than truly 
facilitating administrative action. The ideas of good government are rooted in a concern 
with ‘respect for persons’ and an acknowledgement that an unadulterated utilitarian 
focus on achieving social goals takes insufficient account of the status and autonomy of 
individuals in society on whose behalf government exercises power.
64
 Thus in some 
ways it is true that this form of facilitation is linked to controlling because principles of 
good government do function as constraints on government action in the interest of 
individuals. However, such principles also play a facilitating role in shaping 
administrative decision-making in a positive and proactive way, informing 
administrators of the values that should underpin their decisions if they are to be 
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justifiable and legitimate, in the eyes of not only the courts, but also the general public 
on whose behalf the powers are exercised.  This sense of ‘facilitating’ is therefore 
different from ‘controlling’ as its objective is to ‘promote the validity of administrative 
action, rather than struggling to prevent its abuse’.
65
 
There are a number of constitutional values and principles that can and should 
inform exercises of administrative decision-making to instil ‘ideals of good governance’ 
and encourage the development of an ‘internal morality of the administration’. The first 
important principle is the rule of law, a founding value of the Constitution, which 
requires as a minimum, that every exercise of public power should be rational and 
should not be arbitrary.
66
 The rule of law also places value on certainty, predictability 
and reliability so that people may conform their conduct to the law.
67
 Equality, too, 
which includes the idea of fair and equal treatment in similar cases, is a value inherent in 
the rule of law and underpins the Bill of Rights.  The founding values of the 
Constitution also emphasise 'democratic government to ensure accountability, openness 
and responsiveness'.
68
 In this way the Constitution envisions not merely a 'snapshot' 
representative democracy, but a participatory one in which individuals are afforded an 
opportunity to participate in decisions that affect them and the government (and the 
administration in particular) must justify its decisions to the governed.
69
  
The relevance of these values and principles to the administration is echoed in 
section 195 of the Constitution, which sets out the principles applicable to the public 
administration. It provides, among others, that services must be provided impartially, 
fairly, equitably and without bias, that people's needs must be responded to and the 
public must be encouraged to participate in policy-making, that the public 
administration must be accountable and that transparency must be fostered by providing 
the public with timely, accessible and accurate information. Further, it is clear from 
section 33(3) of the Constitution that all of these values and principles must be applied 
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in a manner that is not overwhelming for the administration to implement, a manner 
which 'promotes an efficient administration'.
70
 
The objectives discussed above are both legitimate and necessary, but they are in 
creative tension with one another. The central challenge for administrative law, and for 
judges, is to reconcile them and to contribute towards the effectiveness and realisation of 
social interests, while at the same time safeguarding individual interests. This is the 
framework within which courts must conceptualise their response to the prevalence and 
growing use of policy by the administration, and the values from which more specific 
principles of administrative regulation can be derived. The intensity with which the 
principles are applied will depend on a proper application of the 'distinctly South 
African separation of powers' and accompanying imperative for judicial deference. 
Judicial engagement with administrative use of policy has primarily been limited 
to the 'fettering by rigidity principle', which pertains to situations where administrators 
elect to apply policy in the exercise of their statutory discretions and do so rigidly and 
inappropriately. Galligan argues that the fettering-by-rigidity principle functions as a 
'negative constraint' on the exercise of administrative discretion in that it prevents 
administrators from fettering their discretion by applying policies in a rigid way, like 
legal rules, that leaves no room for variation in the circumstances of a particular case.
71
 
It is aimed at telling administrators what they must not do, and so operates within the 
'controlling and confining' paradigm. By limiting themselves in this way he suggests that 
courts have 'neglected to consider whether they may play a more active role in 
positively shaping other aspects of the normative framework'.
72
  
The next part argues that Galligan is only partially correct. The fettering-by-
rigidity principle is not as blunt an instrument as it may first appear. It plays an 
important role in facilitating good governance and effective decision-making by 
fostering participation and transparency. Over time, the principle has also been 
developed by courts to recognise the importance policy plays in shaping the exercise of 
administrative discretion, first, by improving the rational basis of decision-making, and, 
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second, in fostering equality through consistency, transparency and participation.  
Galligan is correct that, although courts have recognised the potential of policy to 
facilitate rational and consistent decision-making, they have failed to take steps to shape 
the normative framework for decision-making to ensure that potential is realised. In part 
3, I consider the potential for the courts to develop new principles to promote 
consistency in situations where administrators depart from their policies in the 
circumstances of the particular case without good reason for doing so. Finally, in part 4, 
I consider the potential for the further development of principles to protect the public 
trust in the administration in circumstances where a new policy is introduced where 





3. FETTERING OF DISCRETION BY RIGIDLY APPLYING POLICIES 
This part considers the principles that apply when it is alleged that an 
administrator fettered her discretion by applying a policy too rigidly and failed to have 
regard to the particular circumstances before her. It explores the nuanced way in which 
this principle has been developed and applied by the courts to give effect to the values of 
good governance.  
 The principle that is primarily applicable is that administrators should not fetter 
their discretion by rigidly applying policies. Fettering of discretion by blind or rigid 
adherence to pre-existing policy was, at common law, a ground upon which 
administrative decisions could be reviewed and set aside (‘the fettering by rigidity 
principle’). Although, it is not one of the grounds of review expressly enumerated in 
section 6 of PAJA, it has, on many occasions, been applied as a ground of review by our 
courts without express reference to PAJA.
73
 It would, in any event, fall under section 
6(2)(e)(iii) (taking into account an irrelevant consideration or failing to consider a 
relevant one), section 6(2)(f)(ii) (the absence of a rational connection between the 
decision and the purpose for which it was taken) or section 6(2)(i) (an action that is 
otherwise unconstitutional or unlawful).
74
  
 The most recent authoritative statement of the principle was made by Nugent JA 
in Kemp NO v Van Wyk
75
:    
A public official who is vested with a discretion must exercise it with an open 
mind but not necessarily a mind that is untrammelled by existing principles or 
policy… [G]enerally, there can be no objection to an official exercising a 
discretion in accordance with an existing policy if he or she is independently 
satisfied that the policy is appropriate to the circumstances of the particular case. 
What is required is only that he or she does not elevate principles or policies into 
rules that are considered to be binding, with the result that no discretion is 
exercised at all. 
 As can be seen from this exposition, the fettering by rigidity principle aims to 
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achieve a balancing of values, or a compromise.
76
 It is primarily a balancing of or 
compromise between the values of flexibility and responsiveness, on the one hand, and 
the values of certainty, fairness and consistency, on the other. The principle allows for 
consistency and certainty through the use of policy ‘but insists that the full rigour of 
certainty and consistency is tempered by a willingness to make exceptions, to respond 
flexibly to unusual situations, and to apply justice in the individual case…’
77
. 
 One of the primary virtues of individualised discretion is that it avoids all-or-
nothing results produced by rules that may sometimes result in injustice to the 
individual. Discretion enables decision-makers to ensure that a particular applicant is 
treated justly in accordance with her circumstances.
78
 After all, a person who 
demonstrates exceptional circumstances shows that she is not like everyone else and 
should be treated differently.
79
 One of the main instances in which the rigid application 
of a policy may result in injustice is where, although the conduct of the applicant may 
fall, strictly speaking, within a prohibition contained in a policy, the relevant purposes of 
the policy would not be undermined by allowing the applicant to continue to act in this 
way.
80
 For example, there may be a policy requiring companies applying for funding to 
ensure that the same company name is reflected on all documents submitted with the 
application to prevent fraud. If some of the documents used the company’s shortened 
name where it was clear the same company was being described, there would be no risk 
of fraud.  
 Although, strictly speaking, the application would not comply with the rule as the 
names used were not exactly the same, this is an appropriate case in which an exception 
should be made as the purpose would not be undermined.
81
 Applying the policy strictly 
in these circumstances would result in legalism and arbitrariness causing ‘technical 
violators’ to lose respect for the public administration. Consequently, tailoring results to 
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unique facts and circumstances of a particular case is generally preferred to rigidity. 
 However, courts have on occasion evidenced a dogmatic insistence on high levels 
of flexibility irrespective of the context of decision-making. This is demonstrated in the 
frequently cited dictum in Computer Investors Group v Minister of Finance
82
: 
Where a discretion has been conferred upon a public body by a statutory provision 
such a body may lay down a general principle for its general guidance, but it may 
not treat it as a hard and fast rule to be applied invariably in every case. At most it 
can be only a guiding principle, in no way decisive. Every case that is presented to 
the public body for its decision must be considered on its merits. In considering 
the matter the public body may have regard to a general principle, but only as a 
guide, not as a decisive factor. (My underlining) 
This dictum suggests a preoccupation with minimising the influence of policy so that 
policy standards may never become norms which determine the outcome of 
discretionary decisions. As explained in part 2, this preoccupation is misplaced since 
discretion may be conferred for the purpose of allowing a more functionally specialised 
expert administrator to make rules to govern the outcome. There is nothing inherent in 
the nature of discretion to prevent this. The level of specificity and prescriptiveness of 
the standards in the policy should ultimately be determined by the particular 
circumstances of the case. The dictum is legitimately concerned that there should be 
room for flexibility since there is often little virtue in making decisions on the basis of 
binding rules without reflecting on the special features of particular cases. But to suggest 
that a policy can never ultimately be a deciding factor in a decision is inappropriate 
because it places undue emphasis on flexibility at the expense of certainty. Luckily, as 
evidenced below, the courts have developed this principle significantly and it is now 
applied in a more nuanced way that takes into account the variability of the different 
contexts in which decision-making occurs. 
 Essentially, the fettering-by-rigidity principle, as it has been developed by the 
courts, has three elements. First, decision-makers may formulate policies to inform the 
exercise of their discretion as long as the policies are intra vires and rational. Second, 
the policy may not fetter the exercise of the decision-maker’s discretion. Third, the 
policy must be disclosed to affected parties, who must be given an opportunity to make 
                                                           




representations. These elements are explored below. 
3.1. Decision-maker may formulate a policy to inform the exercise of their 
discretion as long as the policy is intra vires and rational 
3.1.1. May formulate policy 
 In certain circumstances decision-makers are expressly obliged or empowered by 
a statute to formulate a policy to inform the exercise of a particular discretion. For 
example, the National Housing Act, 107 of 1997 provides that the Minister of Housing 
(now Human Settlements) must publish a National Housing Code, containing national 
housing policy
83
 and the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act, 32 of 2000, 
provides that each municipality must adopt an Integrated Development Plan, for the 
development of the municipality.
84
 However, even if a statute does not expressly confer 
the power to formulate and rely on guidance from policies, South African courts have 
recognised that the power to make policy choices that aim to further the ends sought to 
be achieved by the empowering provision is inherent in the nature of discretion.
85
 
Therefore, it is lawful, and in many cases desirable, for reasons of fairness, coherence 
and consistency, to formulate policies to guide the exercise of statutory discretions.
86
  
 There may be, in certain circumstances, not only a power but a duty to formulate a 
policy. The failure to formulate a policy where such a duty exists, may be irrational or 
unconstitutional. Whether such a duty exists will be based primarily on the 
interpretation of the relevant statute concerned, particularly the nature and breadth of the 
discretion and the subject matter which it regulates. The values of certainty and 
consistency are the primary considerations that will move a court to infer such a duty. 
 In circumstances where decision-makers must make complex decisions, 
considering, balancing and applying various factors across a number of applications or 
situations, considerations of fairness and consistency may obligate the decision-maker to 
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adopt some sort of policy. For example, in In re Findlay
87
 the Secretary of State was 
empowered to release prisoners on parole and had adopted a parole policy to guide him 
in balancing and weighing the complex policy and personal circumstance considerations 
relevant to the exercise of this discretion. Primarily on the basis of the need for 
‘consistency of treatment as between one prisoner and another’
88
 Lord Scarman noted, 
obiter, that: 
I have difficulty in understanding how a Secretary of State could properly manage 
the complexities of his statutory duty without a policy ...the duty of the Secretary 
of State in this case is, as I have already shown, a very complex one. Indeed, the 
complexities are such that an approach based on a carefully formulated policy 
could be said to be called for.
89
 (My underlining). 
 Resource allocation decisions provide a further example. When making resource 
allocation decisions, government authorities often need to formulate criteria and 
priorities in advance to ensure that finite resources are allocated rationally and 
appropriately. In another English case, R v North West Lancashire Health Authority Ex 
p. A
90
, the North West Lancashire Health Authority, an authority with the statutory 
obligation to apply its limited financial resources to 'care for all within its area', had 
formulated a policy for the allocation of public funding for clinical procedures. In these 
circumstances the court observed that: 
regional health authorities have to establish certain priorities in funding different 
treatments from their finite resources. It is natural that each authority, in 
establishing its own priorities, will give greater priority to life-threatening and 
other grave illnesses than to others obviously less demanding of medical 
intervention. The precise allocation and weighting of priorities is clearly a matter 
of judgment for each authority, keeping well in mind its statutory obligations to 
meet the reasonable requirements of all those within its area for which it is 
responsible. It makes sense to have a policy for the purpose—indeed, it might well 
be irrational not to have one...
91
 (My underlining). 
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 There may also be a duty, primarily in the interest of legal certainty, to adopt a 
policy when wide discretionary powers are granted in circumstances in which human 
rights may potentially be infringed. 
 The English case of R (Purdy) v Director of Public Prosecutions
92
 provides an 
illustration of such circumstances. Ms. Purdy who suffered from multiple sclerosis, an 
incurable and progressively debilitating condition, would (as a result of the nature of her 
condition) need her husband's assistance to commit suicide when her condition became 
intolerable. Her concern was that, if he were to assist her, he could potentially be 
prosecuted under the Suicide Act of 1961. This Act criminalised assisted suicide, 
providing that no prosecution should be instituted ‘except by or with the consent of the 
Director of Public Prosecutions’, after taking into account whether there was sufficient 
evidence and whether a prosecution would be in the public interest. A Code for Crown 
Prosecutors ('the Code'), setting out general factors to be considered for and against 
prosecution, had been published to guide the exercise of the discretion to prosecute in all 
cases but it had almost no relevance to assisted-suicide cases. The Director of Public 
Prosecutions had also published reasons for the decision not to prosecute in the specific 
circumstances of one prior case. However, there was no offence specific policy setting 
out the factors that would be taken into consideration by prosecutors in deciding 
whether or not to bring a prosecution in cases of assisted suicide. Ms Purdy argued that 
there was a duty to formulate and publish such a policy and that the failure to do so was 
unlawful. 
 The court accepted that decisions to end one’s life were to be protected by article 
8(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the ECHR”), which protects the 
right to respect for private life, and therefore any interference would have to be 'in 
accordance with law' as required by article 8(2). This standard requires that the law must 
be sufficiently accessible to the individual who is affected by the restriction, and 
sufficiently precise to enable the affected person to understand its scope (known as the 
accessibility requirement) and foresee the consequences of his actions so that he can 
regulate his conduct without breaking the law (known as the foreseeability 
                                                           






 In view of this standard the court held that where a discretionary power 
has the potential to affect human rights there must be a reasonable degree of certainty as 
to the factors that will influence the exercise of the discretion: 
...whilst a law that confers a discretion is not necessarily inconsistent with this 
requirement, the scope of the discretion and the manner of its exercise must be 




 In concluding that insufficient clarity had been provided and that there was a 
consequent duty to prepare and publish an assisted suicide specific prosecution policy 
the court emphasised the central role that the subject matter of the decision had played 
in its decision. It highlighted that clarity and consistency of practice are particularly 
important in a case like Ms Purdy’s, where the subject matter is 'controversial' and 'of 
such sensitivity'.
95
   
 In the South African context, support for the existence of such a duty in the 
human-rights context can be found in the judgment of O’ Regan J in Dawood and 
Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others ("Dawood").
96
 Dawood concerned a 
constitutional challenge by three sets of spouses to certain provisions of the Aliens 
Control Act, 96 of 1991, (“the Aliens Act”) on the basis that they fail to identify the 
criteria relevant to the exercise of the discretionary power to grant or refuse a temporary 
residence permit.  
 In recognition of the importance of family life, the Aliens Act permitted spouses 
of permanent residents to remain in South Africa until their immigration permits were 
granted, as long as they were in possession of a valid temporary residence permit (while 
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other applicants would have to wait outside the country). However, another provision of 
the Aliens Act granted authorities a broad discretion whether to grant or refuse 
temporary residence permit applications. In the absence of any guidance, this broad 
discretion had the potential to significantly undermine the privilege granted to spouses 
and ‘[introduce] an element of arbitrariness’ the effect being that the spouses would both 
be forced to leave South Africa to remain together, or, if finances did not permit this, 
they would be forced to separate, while the alien spouse waited outside South Africa to 
be granted an immigration permit. 
 The government failed to demonstrate any rational purpose for failing to provide 
the guidance which the court found in the circumstances was required: 
rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights must be protected and may not be 
unjustifiably infringed. It is for the Legislature to ensure that, when 
necessary,  guidance is provided as to when limitation of rights will be 
justifiable. It is therefore not ordinarily sufficient for the Legislature merely to 
say that discretionary powers that may be exercised in a manner that could limit 
rights should be read in a manner consistent with the Constitution in the light of 
the constitutional obligations placed on such officials to respect the Constitution. 
Such an approach would often not promote the spirit,  purport and objects of the 
Bill of Rights. Guidance will often be required to ensure that the Constitution 
takes root in the daily practice of governance. Where necessary, such guidance 
must be given. Guidance could be provided either in the legislation itself or, 
where appropriate, by a legislative requirement that delegated legislation 
be  properly enacted by a competent authority.
97
 (My underlining). 
 Consequently, the court held that the relevant provisions of the Aliens Act were 
unconstitutional because they infringed the dignity of persons married to people 
lawfully and permanently resident in South Africa and directed that, among others, 
Parliament rectify the infringement. 
 Dawood can be read as laying down the principle, derived from the rule of law, 
that the law must be sufficiently clear, accessible and precise so that those who are 
affected by it can ascertain the extent of their rights and obligations, particularly in 
contexts where human rights may be affected. The court held that the primary obligation 
to ensure that appropriate guidance is provided in circumstances where a broad 
discretion could limit fundamental rights rests on the legislature. This obligation could 
                                                           




be discharged, so the court said, by providing guidance in the relevant legislation itself, 
or where this was not practical or possible,
98
 by imposing an obligation on the executive 
to enact delegated legislation. The court erred in not explicitly considering policy as a 
means through which standards could be developed to provide guidance in the exercise 
of statutory decision-making. There is no reason that the legislature could not impose an 
obligation to create a policy.
99
 As the Purdy, Lancashire and Findlay cases demonstrate, 
policy provides a flexible means for guiding discretion to ensure certain, consistent and 
responsive decision-making i.e. it can be used to supplement the law to ensure that it 
meets the requisite standard of clarity, accessibility and precision. In any event, where 
legislation does, in error, confer broad discretions in circumstances in which 
fundamental rights could be limited and fails to provide guidance or oblige the 
enactment of delegated legislation,
100
 the administration could ensure that constitutional 
standards of clarity, precision and accessibility are met by the formulation and 
publication of appropriate policies to supplement the legislation and guide the exercise 
of those discretions.   
 As is clear from the above, the circumstances in which discretions are exercised 
vary enormously and the optimum balance between policy and discretion consequently 
also varies from area to area.
101
 However, where human rights are engaged and in 
certain other contexts in which equal treatment is pivotal, it is proper, in furtherance of 
the well-established values of consistency, certainty and fairness, for the judiciary to 
require decision-makers to formulate specific and clear policies.
102
  
3.1.2. Policy must be intra vires 
 Any policy that is developed to guide the exercise of a statutory discretion must be 
within the scope of the powers conferred in the empowering statute, having regard to the 
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100 This will be the case for much legislation enacted prior to Dawood and may by oversight occur in spite of the 
judgment. 
101 Craig Administrative Law 3 ed (1994) at 517- 521. 




purposes of the statute as a whole.
103
  In other words, the policy may not be based on 
irrelevant considerations and may not pursue improper purposes.
104
  This principle 
functions as a legal constraint on the permissible content of policies. Determining 
whether the policy is intra vires is a matter of interpretation of the provisions and the 
purposes of the empowering statute.
105
  
 The manner in which this principle is applied is illustrated in MEC for 
Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land Affairs v Sasol Oil (Pty) Ltd and 
another.
106
 The Gauteng Department of Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and 
Land Affairs (“GDACELA”) was empowered, in terms of the Environmental 
Conservation Act 73 of 1989, to issue environmental authorisations for certain listed 
activities that are potentially detrimental to the environment including the construction, 
erection or upgrading of storage, and handling facilities for dangerous or hazardous 
substances (such as petroleum products). To guide the exercise of its discretion, the 
GDACELA issued guidelines stating, among others, that it would not approve the 
construction of new petrol filling stations situated within 100 m of residential properties, 
schools, or hospitals (unless it could clearly be demonstrated that no significant impacts 
would occur) or within 3 km of existing filling stations in urban or built up residential 
areas. Sasol’s application for environmental authorisation in respect of its proposed 
petrol filling station was refused primarily because it failed to comply with the spatial 
stipulations in the policy and it, therefore, sought to argue that the policy was ultra vires 
the Environmental Conservation Act. The case turned primarily on the interpretation of 
the scope of the empowering provision read with the listed activity. The main question 
was whether GDACELA had the power to regulate only the environmental aspects of 
the storage and handling of petroleum products or whether it could regulate the 
environmental aspects of petrol filling stations more generally. If the former 
interpretation was correct, the policy would be ultra vires. 
 The court held that the scope of the activity must be read consistently with the 
                                                           
103 Baxter (n 1) at 416 , Hoexter (n 77) at 319 and De Ville (n 77) at 112. 
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105 See Allan, TRS ‘Pragmatism and theory in public law’ (1988) 104 L.Q.R 422 at 424 and 427 where Allan explores 
the idea that the exercise of interpretation is not value neutral and argues for the development of proper principles to 
guide judicial intervention. 




purpose of the empowering statute, the environmental right in section 24 of the 
Constitution and other relevant statutes including the National Environmental 
Management Act, 107 of 1998 (“NEMA”), which contains principles that guide all 
decision-making affecting the environment. In other words, the court took a broad and 
purposive approach to interpreting the scope of the activity in light of the wider statutory 
and constitutional context. The principle of sustainable development which requires that 
social, economic and environmental impacts of activities be considered and balanced in 
decisions that impact on the environment is central to both the environmental right and 
NEMA. Viewed within this broad statutory framework the court held that to separate the 
commercial aspects of filling stations from storage and handing would defeat the 
purposes of the empowering provision and the Environmental Conservation Act more 
broadly. Consequently, the scope of the powers conferred on GDACELA included the 
power to regulate 'commercial aspects' and, consequently, the policy was not ultra vires. 
 In a similar matter also decided in terms of the Environmental Conservation Act, 
SLC Property Group (Pty) Ltd and Another v Minister of Environmental Affairs and 
Economic Development and Another,
107
 the policy addressing spatial planning 
considerations relied upon by the administrator was found to be ultra vires the 
empowering provision. The Minister of Environmental Affairs and Development 
Planning, Western Cape, decided, in an appeal against the grant of an environmental 
authorisation, to impose a further condition requiring the developer to make twenty 
percent of the land forming part of its development available for low income housing. In 
making this decision, the Minister relied predominantly on a policy document, the 
Western Cape Spatial Development Framework, which is aimed at redressing past 
spatial policies, through among other measures, inclusionary housing. The court held 
that ‘the imposition of a condition which is aimed at the implementation of housing 
policy is not rationally related to the purposes for which the powers under the ECA were 
given.’
108
 This suggests that the policy itself was ultra vires. 
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 In addition, policies that are inconsistent with express statutory powers and duties 
may also be ultra vires. This principle was applied in Akani Garden Route (Pty) Ltd v 
Pinnacle Point Casino (Pty) Ltd.
109
 The national law regulating gambling made it clear 
that control over gambling, including licensing, vested in independent boards 
(“Boards”). The Western Cape Gambling and Racing Law, 4 of 1996, (“the Provincial 
Legislation”) provided that control over gambling vested in Boards subject to the 
provisions of that Act and policy determinations of the provincial executive regarding 
the size, nature and implementation of the industry. The provincial executive issued a 
determination that successful applicants must provide irrevocable bank or other financial 
institution guarantees acceptable to the Board within 7 days of the grant of the licence. 
 The Provincial Legislation specifically empowered the Board to impose licence 
conditions regarding financial guarantees and to set the terms for such guarantees once 
the licence had been awarded – in other words the Provincial Legislation expressly 
made this function a competence of the Board, not of the provincial executive. 
 The court held that the policy determination obliging an applicant to provide a 
circumscribed financial guarantee prior to the award of the licence emasculated the 
Board as it could not then exercise the power expressly conferred on it by the provincial 
legislature to impose licence conditions regarding the need for financial guarantees. 
Consequently, the policy determination was found to be ultra vires.
110
 
3.1.3. Policy must be rational 
 A closely-related constraint is that the policy itself must be rational. There must be 
a rational connection between the policy and the purpose for which it was formulated 
and it must produce rational results.
111
 Foodcorp (Pty) Ltd v Deputy Director-General, 
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism & Others
112
 provides an example of 
a policy which was set aside because it produced irrational results. The matter involved 
the allocation of commercial fishing rights for pelagic fish (pilchards and anchovies) for 
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executive, as 7 days was impractical and unrealistic).  
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2002-2005 in terms of the Marine Living Resources Act, 18 of 1998 (‘the MLRA’). The 
Minister had determined the total allowable catch for the pelagic species and had 
determined which applicants would qualify for quotas using a points system devised to 
ensure that the objects of the MLRA were realised. A mathematical formula was 
developed to determine the allocation of the total allowable catch between those who 
qualified for quotas. The mathematical formula produced inexplicable results. One of 
the applicants, the appellant in the case, who had a canning facility at which pilchards 
could be processed, was granted a very minor increase in its allocation when compared 
to the previous season’s allocation. While two other applicants, who did not have 
canning facilities, and would therefore create less value through their operations, 
received increases in their quota allocation relative to the appellant’s quota allocation of  
87 000% and 457% respectively. The Department of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism could not offer any rational justification for these disparities which 
‘inexplicably and unreasonably favoured’ some applicants at the expense of others and 
had, in fact, not been aware of the disparities at the time of the allocation. The court took 
the view that a reasonable decision-maker would have applied the mathematical formula 
but would then have applied its mind to the results to consider whether they were 
justifiable in relation to the facts. The formula produced irrational results and was 
consequently irrational. 
3.2. Policy may not preclude or fetter the exercise of the decision-maker’s 
discretion 
3.2.1. Unpacking the principle 
 The classic exposition of the requirement not to fetter or preclude the exercise of 




There are on the one hand cases where a tribunal in the honest exercise of its 
discretion has adopted a policy, and, without refusing to hear an applicant, 
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intimates to him what its policy is, and that after hearing him it will in 
accordance with its policy decide against him, unless there is something 
exceptional in his case…(I)f the policy has been adopted for reasons which the 
tribunal may legitimately entertain, no objection can be taken to such a course. 
On the other hand there are cases where a tribunal has passed a rule, or come to a 
determination, not to hear any application of a particular character by 
whomsoever made. There is a wide distinction between these two classes. (My 
underlining). 
 Bankes L.J. distinguishes between two scenarios, the first of which is permissible 
and the second of which is not. The second scenario, passing a rule ‘not to hear any 
application of a particular character by whomsoever made’ involves a complete 
disregard of the merits and is impermissible. Policies must be used as a guideline and 
should not be applied formulaically, in an all-or-nothing way, automatically determining 
all cases falling within their purview (in the way that rules do). Where a decision-maker 
fails to consider the individual circumstances of the applicant to determine whether 
those circumstances justify a change in policy or an exception to it, the decision-maker 
will have failed to exercise any discretion at all.
114
 
 Johannesburg Town Council v Norman Anstey & Co
115
 provides an illustration of 
this second scenario.  A committee of the Johannesburg Town Council had refused to 
grant a tearoom licence on the basis of its policy that refreshment shops could not have 
internal means of communication with other shops. This it did solely because the 
applicant had stated it would be impossible to make necessary alterations to prevent 
communication.  In addition, there was evidence that on previous occasions the policy 
had been applied rigidly and applications had been refused without regard to 
representations made by applicants. The court therefore held that the committee had laid 
down a hard and fast rule applied to all applications. In other words, once the 
Committee had established that there was internal communication between the 
refreshment room and another shop, no other circumstances were taken into 
consideration and the general rule was applied. 
 The Johannesburg Town Council case makes it clear that, at a minimum, the 
decision-maker must listen to and be willing to consider the particular circumstances of 
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the case and must demonstrate some willingness to entertain exceptions in a deserving 
case. It is a principle that ‘directs attention to the attitude of the decision-maker, 




 It is not appropriate to infer from the mere fact that a policy is applied without 
more that the decision-maker was not aware of his discretion and of his duty to consider 
the circumstances of the case.
117
 Nor is it possible to conclude from assertions by the 
decision-maker that he had listened to the applicant and was willing to make exceptions 
that those assertions are true. The willingness to entertain exceptions will be assessed by 
a court with reference to all the circumstances of the case, including the wording of the 
policy (where it is in written form) and related documents (including the reasons for the 
decision)
118
 and the conduct of the decision-maker. For example in Minister of 
Environmental Affairs & Tourism v Scenematic Fourteen (Pty) Ltd
119
 the decision-
maker had adopted a set of criteria and a system of scoring to assess applications for the 
allocation of fishing rights which in effect rigidly circumscribed the factors that the 
decision-maker could take into account and the weight each one would carry in deciding 
the allocation of fishing rights. However, it was apparent from the circumstances that 
the decision-maker and his advisory committee applied the policy in a manner that 
provided for exceptions since adjustments were made in circumstances where the 
criteria and weighting were, for any reason, inappropriate. 
 Where a policy is in writing there should be some evidence on the face of the 
policy that exceptions will be made.
120
 For example ‘applicants who already have an 
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119 2005 (6) SA 182) (SCA). 
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undergraduate degree will not be considered for bursaries unless exceptional 
circumstances are present’ or ‘applicants who already have an undergraduate degree will 
normally not be considered for bursaries but applications will be considered on their 
merits.’ The importance of this requirement is that the public rely on policy documents 
for guidance and where a policy is formulated in blanket terms, for example ‘applicants 
who already have an undergraduate degree will not be considered for bursaries’, then the 
public may understand the policy as a rule and be dissuaded from applying.
121
 In 
circumstances where a policy that specifies that exceptional circumstances will be 
considered but in reality no exceptional circumstances could be envisaged, the policy 
would in effect amount to a blanket policy which unduly fetters the decision-maker’s 
discretion.
122
  Thus it should be apparent that the wording of the policy alone is unlikely 
to be a decisive factor as to whether there has been a fettering of discretion.  
 The conduct of the decision-maker will also be an important factor. Evidence that 
the decision-maker refused to make exceptions to its policy in all previous applications 
(that is to say it has consistently rejected applications of a certain class), as occurred in 
the Johannesburg Town Council case, may be an indication that, irrespective of the 
flexible manner in which the policy is framed, the decision-maker has determined that it 
will apply its policy rigidly.
123
  
 The decision-maker must generally approach each decision with an open mind but 
it need not be a mind ‘untrammelled by existing principles or policy’ such that each new 
matter is considered afresh, without preconceptions. Where the decision-maker is 
independently satisfied that the policy applies, it may legitimately influence the 
decision-maker, in effect creating a presumption which the applicant will have to 
rebut.
124
 The decision-maker will, therefore, only be required to depart in ‘exceptional’ 
or ‘unusual situations’, where the applicant has something to say that renders the policy 
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inappropriate or improper in the circumstances. These principles are aptly illustrated by 
Innes CJ in Britten & Others v Pope
125
: 
[T]he Committee adopted the general view that, save under special 
circumstances, companies of the class referred to, should not be allowed to 
acquire the ownership of retail businesses because it tended to promote 
monopolies and other abuses. They did not exclude such companies from the 
acquisition of retail interests, but they regarded their applications with disfavour, 
and only consented if, upon investigation, special circumstances in support were 
found to exist. Such an attitude was not, in my judgment, illegal or improper. It 
certainly involved the exercise of discretion in each instance; and if it imposed a 
fetter upon that discretion (whatever that may mean), so in varying degree, 
would every application of general principles to the facts of a particular case. Yet 
it could surely not be contended that each set of facts should be considered 
without reference to policy or principle lest the resulting decision should be 
invalidated. (My underlining). 
Another way of expressing the same point is that it is acceptable for the policy to 
become a norm which, subject only to the decision-maker directing itself whether in 
light of the particular situation the policy should apply, should be modified or an 
exception should be made, determines the outcome of particular decisions.
126
  However, 
‘courts are not always consistent in their attitudes to the relationship between [policy] 
and the particular case, and may take a more or less restrictive view’.
127
 
3.2.2. Variability, weight and relevance 
The fettering by rigidity principle, like many other grounds of review, is elastic. 
It is not applied in an all-or-nothing manner, but flexibly with different degrees of 
intensity
128
 depending on the context.
129
 The circumstances of the case are all-important. 
In some circumstances a court will not intervene, even where policies have been applied 
in a ‘rigid’, rule-like fashion. For example, where there are numerous applications in 
similar circumstances fairness, certainty and consistency may dictate that the 
applications should be considered against similar criteria to prevent arbitrariness.
130
 
Similarly, it may be more acceptable that enforcement policies are applied more rigidly 
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than deterrence policies. At the other end of the spectrum, where applications are few, 
decision-making factors are complex and circumstances vary greatly, more flexibility 
will be required as pre-determined rules have less relevance. For example, where 
authorities are required to make decisions in the best interests of a child it will almost 
always be necessary to consider the particular circumstances of the child concerned.
131
 
In such cases courts are far less likely to tolerate the blanket application of policies. 
Also, a related point is that where human rights are engaged a greater degree of 
flexibility will be required as the impact of the policy on the individual will carry more 
weight in the decision-making process (although it is preferable that policies that impact 
on human rights are formulated with clarity and precision so that the individual whose 
rights are affected knows where he stands).
132
 
It is unsurprising that a variable approach has been taken to applying the 
fettering-by-rigidity principle as the principle is essentially a particular instance of 
relevancy review. A policy is a particular type of relevant consideration, or set of 
relevant considerations,
133
 that influences the exercise of statutory discretions.
134
 In 
other words, in terms of the general principles of administrative law, policy must be 
taken into account and may be, but is not necessarily, decisive of the outcome of a 
particular application. When a decision-maker fails to consider the merits of a particular 
case at all, he or she fails to consider relevant considerations. Slavish adherence to a 
policy would lead to that result.  
Relevance and weight are determined on a proper interpretation of the statue 
concerned in light of the particular circumstances of the case and are closely related to 
questions of reasonableness and rationality.
135
 As Allan explains: 
The extent to which an authority may be permitted to confine its exercise of 
discretion by adopting a policy must also depend on the circumstances of the 
case. There can be no general principle dictating the limits of such a policy, such 
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that it should never be more than one relevant factor influencing the tribunal’s 
decision: it is entirely a question of what the particular context requires.
136
 
Questions concerning the weight of relevant factors are ordinarily for the 
decision-maker, not the court, to determine. Making determinations as to the weighting 
of relevant factors could be seen to be usurping the functions of the administration in 
violation of the constitutional separation of powers. However this doesn’t mean that 
courts will never make determinations regarding the weight afforded to particular 
relevant considerations. They should simply exercise caution and should only do so 
where there are compelling reasons of legal principle in the circumstances of the 
particular case.  Thus it would be inappropriate for a court to make a blanket 
determination that policy-related factors can never carry such weight that they determine 
the outcome of a decision. However, where decision-makers fail to consider the special 
circumstances of the case at all, a court is justified in setting the decision aside since this 
is not a question of weight, but rather of relevancy, which is within the remit of the 
courts. The strictness of scrutiny in enforcing these requirements will vary according to 
the specific facts of the case.  
This contextual approach to the fettering-by-rigidity principle is apparent in the 
decisions in Bato Star and National Lotteries Board and others v SA Education and 
Environment Project and another.
137
 
In Bato Star the court held that, in the context of allocating fishing quotas for 
hake, a complex and policy-related decision, it was acceptable for the Chief Director to 
adopt and apply a policy of a blanket nature which precluded the consideration of any 
factors other than the criteria he had adopted.    
The deep sea trawl hake allocation decision was based on a guideline, which set 
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out the relevant competing policy considerations provided for in the Act and provided 
further detailed requirements. Based on the guideline, a range of criteria were adopted 
and each applicant was scored, by an advisory committee, against each of the criteria 
with reference to a pre-determined points system.  The scores calculated by the advisory 
committee formed the basis of the Chief Director’s evaluation of the applications. Five 
percent of the quota granted to each applicant in 2001 was deducted from their new 
quota and put into a redistribution pool.  The redistribution pool was then distributed 
amongst rights holders in direct proportion to their scores.   
The applicant argued that other relevant considerations pertaining to its 
individual circumstances had not been taken into account. Specifically, the applicant 
alleged that, by rigidly applying the guidelines, the Chief Director did not apply his 
mind to the tonnage it had applied for and did not take into account the applicant’s 
increase in capacity since the previous allocation. 
In response the court emphasized the fairness of the procedure as between 
applicants and in relation to each individual applicant. This resource-allocation decision 
involved a large number of applications that had to be considered for the allocation of 
limited resources. In the interest of fairness as between applicants, it was desirable to 
adopt and apply relevant general criteria to ensure that the applications were evaluated 
consistently. Further, individual applications were treated fairly as the individual merits 
of each application were carefully considered against a range of criteria, identified as 
being relevant in relation to the objects of the Act. In essence the court held that the 
tonnage that the applicant had applied for was not relevant as the total allowable catch 
was limited and the total allocation applied for by all the applicants had significantly 
exceeded the available allocation. In these circumstances it was the nature of the 
decision that dictated that the approach by the decision-maker was appropriate, whereas 
in other contexts this most likely would not have been the case.
138
 
In National Lotteries Board, also a resource-allocation decision, a policy similar 
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in nature to that considered in British Oxygen
139
 was adopted. The court, although 
conceding that the policy was of the type that did not readily admit of exceptions, 
nevertheless found that there had been fettering since the approach taken by the National 
Lotteries Board (‘the Board’) was so technical as to amount to a misapplication of the 
policy. By adopting an unduly technical approach the decision-maker had undermined 
the important purposes for which the power was given. 
The Board was empowered in terms of the Lotteries Act, 57 of 1997, to consider 
applications for financial grants from the National Lottery Distribution Trust Fund. In 
relation to the nature and purpose of the power the court noted that the Board held 
public funds in trust and had a responsibility to distribute the funds to socially worthy 
causes such as charitable pursuits and arts, culture and heritage, for which there was an 
overwhelming need. However, there was evidence that it had miserably failed in its duty 
to distribute these funds, in certain circumstances distributing only 15% of the available 
amount.  
The Board published an application guideline (‘the Guideline’) aimed at 
achieving a number of related purposes, namely, to ensure that applications were treated 
consistently, to ensure that funds were allocated only to organizations capable of 
administering them for their intended purpose and to minimize the risk of fraud. For 
example, one requirement was the submission of audited financial statements by all 
applicants. The court accepted that the Guideline was within the scope of the 
empowering statute and generally served useful and legitimate purposes.  
The Board applied its policy strictly, and without exception, justifying its 
approach on administrative efficiency and consistency grounds. It argued that it could 
not be expected to investigate every application that did not comply with the clear and 
not unduly burdensome requirements of the Guideline. This is because since it was 
dealing with finite resources, it had received a significant number of applications and it 
had limited human-resource capacity, The court acknowledged that the nature of the 
Guideline was such that in most cases it would be justifiable to treat the requirements as 
peremptory since it would be untenable to insist on compliance from one applicant but 
                                                           




not from others. Generally, any non-compliance would result in a failure to achieve the 
purposes of the policy and the decision-maker would therefore be justified in refusing to 
admit exceptions.
140
 However, in this case the Board applied the policy literally, without 
considering the purposes of the policy, amounting in affect to a misapplication of the 
Guideline. 
One of the requirements set out in the Guideline, among others that the court 
considered, was that the same name must be used throughout the application. The 
purpose of the requirement was to prevent fraud. One application for funding was 
refused due to non-compliance with this provision. The application documents referred 
to the full name of the applicant organisation, Claremont Methodist Church Social 
Impact Ministry, Sikhula Sonke, while other supporting documents referred to the 
shortened name, Sikhula Sonke. The court held that it was apparent on the face of the 
application that the documents referred to the same organization since the company 
registration number was the same.
141
 Most importantly, since it was clear that it was the 
same organization there was no risk of fraud in these circumstances and the purpose of 
the guideline would not have been undermined by accepting such an application. 
Therefore, the court held that the Guideline had been applied rigidly without 
justification.  
Ultimately, the court's decision turned on the nature and purpose of the power, 
namely the pressing need to ensure that funds were distributed to assist in socially-
worthy causes. The Board’s approach of formalistically refusing applications in 
circumstances where the legitimate purposes pursued by the Guidelines were not 
undermined had the effect of subverting the purpose for which the power had been given 
and was inappropriate and improper in the context. 
3.3. Policy must be disclosed to affected parties who must be given an 
opportunity to make representations 
One rationale for the fettering-by-rigidity principle is that it creates space for 
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meaningful participation. Where policy is applied rigidly, interested and affected parties 




 Two aspects related to procedural fairness are implied by the fettering-by-rigidity 
principle – first, that the policy should be published or made accessible to those affected 
and, secondly, that they should be afforded the opportunity to make representations. 
3.3.1. Publication 
 In terms of South African administrative law the content of the requirements of 
procedural fairness depends on the circumstances of each case. Section 3(2)(b)(i) of 
PAJA requires that the decision-maker must give ‘adequate notice of the nature and 
purpose of the proposed administrative action’. Where a decision-maker has a policy 
that materially influences the decision it should be disclosed to an affected party so that 
she can make meaningful and informed representations to the public body before the 
decision is made. 
 Tseleng v Chairman, Unemployment Insurance Board, and Another
143
 illustrates 
this principle. In this case the Unemployment Insurance Board refused the extension of 
the applicant’s unemployment benefits on the basis of its policy that further benefits 
would not be granted unless the applicant had sought employment during the period in 
which the initial unemployment benefits had been paid to him. The applicant had not 
been aware of the policy and thus had failed to demonstrate that he had met the 
requirement (although he had in fact done so).  In considering whether the failure to 
advise the applicant of the policy was procedurally unfair the court held: 
[p]erhaps the policy is a sound one, but if a statutory body considers that 
such a consideration is so material as of itself to determine the fate of an 
application, then it should at the very least afford an applicant the opportunity of 
dealing with its difficulty and not keep the policy to itself … To hold otherwise 
would be to countenance injustice, since persons who might otherwise be fully 
able to justify their application would be deprived of the opportunity of doing so. 
…  
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It is beyond question administratively unfair to fail to draw to the attention of an 
applicant that a board relies upon a particular policy and, by such failure, to 
deprive the applicant of the opportunity of making submissions as to why he 
should be treated as one who qualifies within the terms of that policy. 
 The publication of pre-existing administrative policies is a requirement of good 




 In British Oxygen Co. Ltd. v. Board of Trade Lord Reid had the following to say 
about the duty on decision-makers to listen:  
What the authority must not do is to refuse to listen at all. But a ministry 
or large authority may have had to deal already with a multitude of 
similar applications and then they will almost certainly have evolved a 
policy so precise that it could well be called a rule. There can be no 
objection to that, provided the authority is always willing to listen to 
anyone with something new to say—of course I do not mean to say that 
there need be an oral hearing.
 145
 (My underlining). 
 Galligan argues that the fettering-by-rigidity principle is essentially a procedural 
protection to ensure that individuals are heard.
146
 There is no doubt that the obligation to 
hear an affected party is a central aspect of the principle. Exactly what the requirements 
of procedural fairness will be depends on the facts of the particular case, but, at a 
minimum, an affected party should be permitted, after having considered the policy, to 
address the decision-maker on the application of the policy to the particular case. 
3.4. Synthesis 
 As long as a policy is intra vires, it may become a norm which subject to the 
obligation to consider whether to apply, change or make an exception to the policy in a 
particular case, may determine the outcome of decisions. If decision-makers properly 
apply their minds to the merits of cases, courts will generally be hesitant to second-
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guess their decisions to act in accordance with policies because of the potential of 
undermining the separation of power by usurping the legitimate functions of the 
administration. However, the principle is applied with some degree of variability and the 
context, particularly the nature of the decision and its subject matter, will influence the 





4. THE DUTY TO APPLY POLICIES CONSISTENTLY UNLESS THERE IS 
GOOD REASON TO DEPART 
This part considers whether there is a positive role for courts to play in shaping a 
purposive rationality within the administration when administrators elect not to follow 
existing policies in the circumstances of particular cases (as opposed to permanently 
changing policies, which will be considered in the next part). 
4.1. The position in the United Kingdom 
English courts have long recognised that there is a duty for administrators to 
apply policy consistently unless there is a good reason to depart (“the consistency 
principle”).  As early as 1984 Dunn LJ, in R v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, Ex parte Asif Mahmood Khan,
147
 held that the Home Secretary’s departure 
from his own circular on adoption of children living outside the United Kingdom, for 
reasons not contemplated in the circular, was unjustified, unfair and unreasonable: 
[The Home Secretary] caused the circular letter in common form to be sent to all 
applicants setting out the four criteria to be satisfied before leave could be given. 
Thereby, in my judgment, he in effect made his own rules, and stated those 
matters which he regarded as relevant and would consider in reaching his 
decision. The letter said nothing about the natural parents' inability to care for 
the child as being a relevant consideration, and did not even contain a general 
"sweeping up clause" to include all the circumstances of the case which might 
seem relevant to the Home Secretary. The categories of unreasonableness are not 
closed, and in my judgment an unfair action can seldom be a reasonable one... 
[T]he Home Secretary is under a duty to act fairly, and I agree that what 
happened in this case was not only unfair but unreasonable. Although the 
circular letter did not create an estoppel, the Home Secretary set out therein for 
the benefit of applicants the matters to be taken into consideration, and then 
reached his decision upon a consideration which on his own showing was 
irrelevant. In so doing, in my judgment, he misdirected himself according to his 
own criteria and acted unreasonably. (My underlining).
148
 
Although this case did not expressly articulate the consistency principle, it is 
implicit in the court’s reasoning that departing from self-made rules is ordinarily 
unreasonable. As Sir Stephen Sedley has noted, these were the ‘bons mots which 
                                                           
147R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Asif Mahmood Khan [1984] 1 WLR 1337 at1352. 
148 In this case the prescriptive manner in which the policy was framed and the adoption context in which the 
decision-making occurred – such decisions having the potential to a significantly impact on human dignity and family 
life – evidently influenced the court’s strict application of the consistency principle and its refusal to entertain the 




advocates in later years were able to borrow and build on’
149
 to frame the well-
established consistency principle that exists in English law today. 
The idea, that by adopting a prescriptive policy the decision-maker has in effect 
'made its own rules', is significant. It highlights that when discretionary power is 
granted, it implicitly includes the power for the decision-maker to prepare its own 
standards to guide decision-making. If a decision-maker does put in place a policy 
setting out precise and prescriptive standards for decision-making, then it has selected in 
advance (and publicised) the relevant policy considerations and has allocated them a 
pre-determined weight (i.e. that those factors will determine the outcome of the 
decision). The public may then legitimately structure its affairs, relying on that guidance 
in the knowledge that unless there is something special or exceptional, the policy will be 
consistently applied. Thus, when courts require an administrator to apply its policy 
consistently (unless there is good reason to depart) they are not unjustifiably, in 
contravention of the separation of powers, usurping the function of the administrator by 
determining the weight that policy considerations should carry in a decision, but are 
instead giving effect to the administrator's own assessment of the relevance and weight 
of those factors. The more difficult consideration is the level of scrutiny that courts will 
apply in assessing whether the reasons given by the administrator for departing in the 
particular circumstances are ‘good reasons’. This will be considered in more detail later 
in this part. 
The consistency principle has recently been confirmed and elucidated by the 
United Kingdom Supreme Court in two decisions, Lumba v Secretary of State
150
 




Lumba related to the detention of two foreign nationals prior to their deportation. 
The issue was whether an unpublished policy imposing a near blanket ban on the release 
of certain sentenced foreigners, could be applied despite it being in direct conflict with a 
long-established published policy stating that there was a presumption of release prior to 
                                                           
149 Sedley ( n 6)at 260. 
150 Lumba v Secretary of State [2011]UKSC 12. 




deportation in such cases. The majority held that there was a duty not only to comply 
with published policy, but to apply it consistently:  
a decision-maker must follow his published policy (and not some different 
unpublished policy) unless there are good reasons for not doing so. The principle 
that policy must be applied consistently is not in doubt . . . As it is put in De 
Smith’s Judicial Review, 6
th
 ed (2007) at para 12-039: 
“there is an independent duty of consistent application of policies, which is 
based on the principle of equal implementation of laws, non-discrimination and 
the lack of arbitrariness.”
152
 
Inconsistent application of policy demonstrates arbitrariness because decisions 
are reached haphazardly for reasons other than those publically stated to be pertinent to 
the outcome. This undermines commonly-accepted notions of justice, brings the 
decision-making process into disrepute, and erodes trust in government.
153
 In other 
words, it is bad for the public administration if like cases are treated differently: it 
creates a perception that the administration is unfairly discriminating between 
individuals. If policy is applied consistently it allows people to order their affairs, leads 
to fairness as between members of the public (or what is referred to as 'horizontal 
equality'), fosters trust in the government and generally produces decisions that are more 
just. This is the basis for the 'independent duty' to consistently apply policies. 
In Mandalia, the Supreme Court considered the lawfulness of the UK Border 
Agency's decision to refuse a visa extension. Contrary to its stated policy, the agency 
had refused the application without allowing the appellant to submit relevant additional 
information. Lord Wilson held that the Agency’s action was unlawful, citing with 
approval the judgment in R(Nadarajah) v Secretary of state for the Home Department 
[2005] EWCA Civ 1363: 
Where a public authority has issued a promise or adopted a practice which 
represents how it proposes to act in a given area, the law will require the promise 
or practice to be honoured unless there is good reason not to do so. What is the 
principle behind this proposition? It is not far to seek. It is said to be grounded in 
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fairness, and no doubt in general terms that is so. I would prefer to express it 
rather more broadly as a requirement of good administration, by which public 
bodies ought to deal straightforwardly and consistently with the public. 
This dictum relies on the importance of consistency itself. Principles of 
consistency, equality and predictability are fundamental to the rule of law, and have 
been recognised for over 100 years.
154




Importantly, the court in Mandalia distinguished the consistency principle from 
the principle of substantive legitimate expectations (This could be, and in the past had 
been, successfully relied upon to seek the consistent application of policy in situations 
where an administrator had elected to depart from his policy in the circumstances of a 
particular case). It was held that the applicant's right to have his application determined 
in accordance with policy is 'generally taken to flow from a principle, no doubt related 
to the doctrine of legitimate expectation but free-standing'. The distinction is best 
illustrated in a situation where the individual is unaware of the existence of the policy 
until after the decision has already been made. That individual could hardly then be 
heard to argue that she had an expectation that the policy would be applied in her case. 
As will be explained in the next part, legitimate expectations are grounded in the trust 
that the public places in representations made by the administration. If no trust has been 
placed in the representations made in the policy then there is nothing to protect.
156
 
However, it would be unfair to treat the more curious person who is aware of the 
policy differently from the less curious person who is not. The duty to apply policies 
consistently should not depend on whether the individual has knowledge of the policy. It 
is inherent in the idea of policy as a guide to decision-making that it be used consistently 
so that decisions do not result in arbitrariness or discrimination. Consequently, the use 
of the consistency principle is to be preferred to the substantive legitimate expectation 
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Thus, the position in England is that the courts will hold administrators to their 
current policies unless there are good reasons to depart from them. The values which 
underpin this principle are, primarily, equality and fairness, both of which require that 
like cases should be treated alike. 
4.2. The position in South Africa 
While the consistency principle has not explicitly been adopted in South African 
law, from the analysis above, it is apparent that it is consistent with our fundamental 
constitutional values, and particularly those that are central to administrative law.
158
 
Further, if South African courts were to adopt the consistency principle they could draw 
on and develop their existing jurisprudence on the fettering-by-rigidity principle, with 
which the consistency principle is compatible and to which it would function as a 
corollary. As explained in the Part 3, the fettering-by-rigidity principle is not concerned 
with maintaining flexibility at all costs (since it could not plausibly be argued that each 
new decision, irrespective of its nature and context, should be considered afresh, free of 
policy constraints and the insights gained from past experience). It seeks to achieve a 
balance between flexibility and responsiveness, on the one hand, and certainty and 
consistency, on the other.   
South African courts have recognised that the adoption of policy to guide 
discretion is 'legally permissible' and 'eminently sensible'
159
 and, in certain 
circumstances, is even ‘necessary to the intelligent exercise’ of administrative 
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6(2)(h), the administrative action was unreasonable. 






  The particular virtues of policy, which have caused the courts to look 
favourably on its adoption, are lucidly and succinctly captured in Booth
161
: 
The formulation and adoption of policy documents, particularly after a process 
of public participation and with external expert assistance, is a valuable tool of 
government…. A properly researched and formulated policy aids rational, 
coherent and consistent decision-making. It provides a large measure of useful 
predictability to the public. It avoids the need for time-consuming investigations 
…[each time an application is made]  – ‘reinventing the wheel’ as Prof Hoexter 
puts it. (My underlining) 
None of these virtues will be realised if policy is not applied consistently. If a 
policy is adopted but only applied selectively at the whim of the administrator, then it 





, or, most importantly, to 'aid consistent decision-
making'. Thus the mere adoption of a policy is insufficient to foster the values of 
certainty, fairness and consistency. To advance these values the policy must be applied 
with reasonable consistency: 'where a policy is published it is not difficult to ask and not 
easy to answer the question: what is the point in publishing your policy if you are going 
to ignore it or apply it randomly?’
164
  
So it is an implicit expectation in all of the judgments referred to above that once a 
policy is adopted it will be applied consistently.
165
 This expectation was explicitly 
articulated by the Constitutional Court in Kaunda and others v President of the Republic 
of South Africa and Other
166
  
The government’s policy on this issue is that it makes representations concerning 
the imposition of such punishment only if and when such punishment is imposed 
on a South African citizen…The applicants are entitled to the benefit of this policy, 
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164 Sedley (n 6) at 260.  In other words: it is irrational to adopt a policy and then act as if it does not exist. 
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and if capital punishment were to be imposed on them, then consistently with its 
policy, government would have to make representations on their behalf. There is no 
evidence to suggest that this would not happen.(My underlining). 
Thus there is a strong basis, in our existing jurisprudence, for the recognition of the 
consistency principle. 
Some commentators have argued that the consistency principle undermines 
individual justice, signalling a shift in legal focus from the individual circumstances to 
good administration, from flexibility and responsiveness to a principle of horizontal 
equality. 
167
 Rigid adherence to the consistent application of policy without regard to the 
special circumstances of the particular case would have this result. However, this is not 
what the consistency principle demands: the principle permits administrators to depart 
from their policies where there is good reason for doing so (and this includes the special 
or exceptional circumstances of an individual's case). What the principle requires is a 
'strict but not unbending' regard for policy.
168
 In this way the consistency principle 
mirrors the fettering-by-rigidity principle: they are two sides of the same coin.  
Both principles shape the normative framework for decision-making and engender 
accountability from the administration for the way its power is exercised and both are 
concerned with individual justice. The problem, when policies that are generally treated 
as law by officials remain ‘soft’ (i.e. where there is no enforceable obligation on 
administrators to apply them consistently), is that they become asymmetrical in their 
operation:
169
 Administrators can hold individuals to administrative policies (in a manner 
similar to legal rules, subject to flexibility), but individuals cannot hold administrators to 
their own policies. Through the application of the consistency principle the 
administration is held accountable for implementing policies consistently and if it 
departs it is obliged to justify the decision: to explain to courts and affected individuals 
the reasons for departure. Without the consistency principle, the administration is 
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unaccountable. It becomes the judge in its own case.
170
 Therefore the consistency 
principle fosters accountability, transparency and openness which are all founding 
values of the Constitution. 
The difficult question is what constitutes a 'good reason' to depart from a policy 
and what is the appropriate intensity with which to scrutinise the reasons put forward by 
the decision-maker. Both questions raise separation of powers concerns as courts will be 
required to directly engage with the merits of the decision. For the executive, the 
recognition of the consistency principle (and the principle of substantive legitimate 
expectations discussed in the next part) may seem like the ‘arrival of a judicial tank on 
the departmental lawn’.
171
 However, these principles are not new for courts. The courts 
have been clothed with potentially awesome power by the Constitution and are required 
themselves to determine the limits to those powers.
172
 However, they must uphold the 
separation of powers, they must respect legitimate public purposes pursued by 
government, be cognisant of their own institutional limitations and refrain from usurping 
the functions of other organs of government. These requirements are crucial to 
maintaining the moral authority and public confidence that are central to the efficacy of 
the judicial function.
173
 A further requirement of the separation of powers doctrine is 
that the courts should provide a check on public power, particularly in a one party 
dominant democracy where loyalty to the party undermines the effectiveness of the 
legislature's oversight of the powers of the executive. It is pivotal that courts do not 
shrink from their duty to protect individuals from abuses of power and to develop 'legal 
rules to induce … the wise and humane use of public power'.
174
 
The standard of review employed by the courts is variable and will be determined by 
the context, ranging from bare rationality to reasonableness.
175
  This flexibility ensures 
that courts can strike an appropriate balance, not only between consistency and 
flexibility, but between controlling the administration and holding it accountable on the 
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one hand, and facilitating and guiding it on the other.
 
The manner in which the courts 





5.  LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS 
This part examines the scope for South African law to be developed to accommodate 
the substantive protection of legitimate expectations arising from policy in 
circumstances where the administration has replaced its old policy with a new one. This 
is an area where the courts have an important, but limited, role in promoting respect for 
persons within the administration. The claim made by the individual is a more radical 
one than those considered so far: it is a claim that her expectation carries such weight 
that not only should the pre-existing policy be applied, but it should be applied in the 
face of a change in policy.
176
 It presents a slight variation on the theme that has been 
explored throughout this paper: the balancing of certainty and flexibility.  The 
expectation engages the values of certainty and fairness but also raises a fundamental 




Administrators may, through their conduct or representations, give rise to an 
expectation on the part of an individual or class of individuals of some benefit or 
advantage. The expected benefit is usually substantive but may be procedural (in other 
words, the expectation that a hearing will be held before a decision is taken). The 
doctrine of legitimate expectation seeks to resolve the conflict between protecting the 
individual’s confidence in expectations created by the administration and the need for 
the administration to pursue changing policy objectives. The upshot is that, in certain 
circumstances, the law will afford protection to such expectations.  
The doctrine of legitimate expectations was accepted into South African law by 
the Appellate Division in Administrator, Transvaal v Traub,
178
 where it was recognised 
that a legitimate expectation may arise ‘from an express promise given on behalf of a 
public authority or from the existence of a regular practice which the claimant can 
reasonably expect to continue....’. A legitimate expectation may be engendered through 
established policy (which is effectively a statement of the administration's intended 
course of action for the future and, for the reasons discussed in the prior two parts, will 
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ordinarily give rise to a regular practice).
179
 As mentioned previously, due to its 
prevalence, policy has become one of the most significant sources of people’s 
expectations of how they will be treated by the government. However, in view of the 
constitutional principles that government is entitled to change its policies, there cannot 
be an expectation that the representations made in a policy may be relied upon 
indefinitely. In Premier Mpumalanga,
180
 the Constitutional Court held that: 
Citizens are entitled to expect that government policy will ordinarily not be 
altered in ways that would harm their rights or legitimate expectations without 
their being given reasonable notice of the proposed change or an opportunity to 
make representations to the decision-maker. 
This reflects a recognition of only the procedural protection of legitimate 
expectations (irrespective of whether the expectation itself is substantive or procedural 
in nature). However, there have been strong indications that legitimate expectations will 
receive substantive protection under South African law
181
 in future, and there have, in 
fact,  been some instances where substantive protection has effectively been afforded to 
expectations (although it was not conceptualised or articulated as the substantive 
protection of a legitimate expectation).
182
 However, the substantive protection thus far 
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offered by the courts does not extend to protect legitimate expectations, in the face of a 
change in policy, in the manner contemplated here.
183
 
Much has been written about the potential forms that substantive protection may 
take.
184
 I will not focus on these intricacies since the arguments here are made at the 
level of principle, rather than form, and in any event, as Quinot correctly concludes, in 




In essence, in assessing whether a legitimate expectation should be protected 
substantively, courts will first determine whether any legitimate expectations exist and, 
if so, the expectations will then be balanced against the public purpose underpinning 
changes in policy. A variable standard of scrutiny will be applied taking into account the 
separation of powers and judicial deference. I set out below a more detailed overview of 
the values underpinning the substantive protection of legitimate expectations, examine 
the requirements for an expectation to have legitimacy in a change of policy context 
and, finally, explain the nature and application of the ‘balancing’ assessment undertaken 
by the court and illustrate, through an example, the manner in which it would function in 
practice. 
5.1. Values underpinning the substantive protection of legitimate expectations 
As mentioned above, the main values underpinning the substantive protection of 
legitimate expectations, as in the context of fettering by rigidity and the consistency 
principle, are fairness and certainty weighed against flexibility. In the context of 
substantive legitimate expectations 'flexibility' refers to the need to preserve the liberty 
of the administration to change its policies in the public interest in changing 
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circumstances to ensure the effective realisation of government purposes. It is a central 
feature of our Constitution that public policy should not be ossified or unduly fettered. 
For this reason the substantive protection of legitimate expectation is ‘hedged with 
qualifications and contingent upon a number of different factors’,
186
 while certainty and 
fairness underpin the need to protect the trust
187
 that individuals or groups place in 
representations made by the administration through its policy documents. 
The question for the court, then, is ‘the degree to which an individual’s 
expectations may be safeguarded in the face of a change in policy which tends to 
undermine them.’
188
  So, on the one side of the scale is the unfairness of frustrating the 
expectation and undermining the public interest in legal certainty and on the other  is the 
duty to pursue the public interest ‘which is never static' and may conflict with the 
legitimate expectations created by prior policy.
189
 Consequently, a balancing exercise 
must be performed, first by the administration but ultimately by the courts, with the 
overarching aim of ensuring that administrative powers are exercised with due respect 
for those whose benefit the power exists (in so far as it is possible to do so without 
undermining the public interest).  
In complex modern societies, individuals have little choice but to rely on 
representations made by the administration to order their lives so as to avoid adverse 
consequences or obtain certain benefits because so many aspects of social and economic 
life are regulated by the administration. The rule of law requires stability in the legal 
relationship between the public and the government; it requires regularity, predictability 
and certainty in government’s dealings with the public.
190
 The purpose is for the law to 
provide guidance to individuals enabling them to predict with reasonable accuracy the 
nature and extent of state action in so far as it affects their affairs and to order them 
accordingly. Thus the basis for the legitimate-expectation doctrine is that the law should 
protect the trust that has been reposed in undertakings made by government about the 
way it will behave in the future: 
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‘Good government depends upon trust between the governed and the governor. 
Unless that trust is sustained and protected officials will not be believed and 
individuals will not order their affairs on that assumption. “Government becomes 
a choice between chaos and coercion.”’
 191 
 
It is unfair to raise expectations of future conduct which are subsequently 
disappointed without good reason. Thus, the substantive protection of legitimate 
expectations plays a positive role in obliging the administration to take account of 
special individual expectations that may be thwarted by a change in policy and attempt 
to optimise them to the extent possible within the new policy.
192
 This facilitates the task 




The role of courts, therefore, is to ensure minimal standards of treatment for 
individuals, generally without defeating the public-interest objectives pursued by the 
administration. It involves a concern on the part of the court to ensure that public 
interest is effectively and efficiently furthered and that the legitimate objectives of 
government are achieved but also guards against overzealous policy implementation that 
unfairly prejudices individuals who placed trust in, and reliance on, government policy. 
5.2. Legitimacy 
Whether an expectation has been created is a question of fact that will be 
determined in the circumstances of a particular case. The expectation must be legitimate, 
the question being 'whether viewed objectively, such expectation is, in a legal sense 
legitimate'. In National Direct of Public Prosecutions v Philips
194
 Heher J laid down the 
requirements for legitimacy as being a reasonable expectation that was induced by the 
decision-maker based on an unambiguous representation which it was competent for the 
decision-maker to make. 
As has been discussed in Part 2, policies may vary in their specificity, precision 
and prescriptiveness.  Therefore, the nature of the policy and the way it is framed would 
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have to be considered to determine whether it establishes a legitimate expectation. 
However, policies that take the form of 'soft law', which are the subject of this paper, are 
framed in a precise and prescriptive way and thus would generally give rise to a 
legitimate expectation. The expectation would likely be of a substantive benefit arising 
from the prior policy or (given that policies may be subject to exceptions) that the prior 
policy will be fairly applied (without necessarily guaranteeing a favourable outcome). 
An expectation will not be regarded as legitimate if a change to the policy was 
reasonably foreseeable.
195
 The change must have occurred without warning, without 
transitional measures and with immediate effect.
196
 
Detrimental reliance is not ordinarily essential to establish the existence of a 
legitimate expectation. However, in the context of a change in policy, for the 
expectation to carry sufficient weight to ultimately prevail in the balancing assessment, 
it will generally be necessary that the individual has suffered some hardship or detriment 





Once a legitimate expectation has been established the administrator must 
establish a public interest sufficient to justify its frustration. It is for the administration 
to determine requirements of the public interest and how to achieve them, including 
whether a policy change is necessary to do so. The court will seek to accommodate the 
individual’s legitimate expectations to the extent that the public purpose sought to be 
achieved through the new policy remains attainable.
198
 In this way the court is sensitive 
to the legitimate constitutional functions of the administration by ensuring that its goal is 
achieved.
199
  If the frustration of the expectation is indispensable to the achievement of 
the public purpose it is almost inevitable that the expectation will be frustrated. 
However, the court will examine whether the frustration of the expectation was 
indispensable to the achievement of the public purpose sought to be achieved and may, 
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depending on the standard of review employed, scrutinise the availability of alternative 
measures.
200
 In this way, one of the outcomes may be that the administration is required 
to reorganise the implementation of its policy.
201
 For this reason courts must be aware of 
the needs of the administration and the consequences of their decisions.
202
 
Questions of substantive legitimate expectations arise most regularly in the 
context of changes of policy in situations of ‘apparent retroactivity’.
203
 Apparent 
retroactivity occurs where a person plans and takes action on the basis of a policy 
publicised by the administration; for example, she takes some steps towards obtaining 
some kind of benefit under the policy, but has not completed the process when the 
policy is changed. She then seeks redress when the policy is altered because even 
though the alteration applies prospectively rather than retrospectively, it may frustrate 
the steps she has already taken in reliance on the old policy.
204
 In these circumstances 
there is a temporal limit to the applicant’s claim.
205
  
The administration must be free to change its policy. The claim under the doctrine 
of legitimate expectations merely impacts on when and for whom that policy takes 
effect.
206
 It does not involve the courts determining a preference for the new policy or 
the old policy. Where an individual or class of individuals have acted in reliance on a 
prior policy, which they had no reason to expect would change, the administration 
should take this into account in determining the class of people to whom the new policy 
applies. Where possible, it should protect those who had acted in reliance on the prior 
policy through the inclusion of transitional provisions in the new policy.
207
 In other 
words, legitimate expectations cannot be used to frustrate the adoption of new policies, 
nor is everyone who operated under the old policy likely to have a legitimate 
expectation that it will be applied to them. Even those who do have such a legitimate 
expectation may have their expectations frustrated if the expectation cannot be 
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accommodated within the public purpose pursued by the administration.
208
 The courts’ 
task is not 'to impede executive activity but to reconcile its continuing need to initiate or 
respond to change with the legitimate interest or expectations of citizens or strangers 




This approach ensures that the administration respects the trust placed in it. 
However courts must be careful not to conflate ends with means. A court cannot 
substitute its view of the policy objective for that of the administration (provided that the 
objective is lawful and rationally connected to the purpose for which the power was 
given). It can, however, examine whether the frustration of the individual expectation is 
necessary to achieve that public purpose or whether alternative means could be adopted 
that achieve it while accommodating the expectation.
210
  It is necessary for courts to be 
willing to scrutinise the reasoning offered by the government with the appropriate 
degree of intensity required by the circumstances to ensure that people are treated with 
sensitivity and respect by government.
211
 
The protection of substantive legitimate expectations has the benefit of increasing 
trust in government and enhancing the acceptability of administrative decision-making 
and promoting a more co-operative relationship between the individual and the state.
212
 
It facilitates the structuring of discretion by informing the administration of the 
underlying values and factors it should consider before changing policy. 
Ex parte Hamble (Offshore) Fisheries Ltd
213
 provides a good example of how the 
balancing exercise would work in the context of the adoption of a new policy. In 
Hamble, a company sought to compel the government to grant it a beam trawl fishing 
licence to fish for ‘pressure stock’ (threatened fish species) in the North Sea because it 
had acted in reliance on a prior government policy that permitted the grant of such 
licences.  
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The Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (“the Department”) was 
responsible for the licensing of fishing activities. In determining its policy for the grant 
of licences it had to balance the needs of the fishing industry and its customers, on the 
one hand, against its obligations, under European community law, to ensure the 
preservation of a sustainable fish stock within the shared-fishing area. The Department’s 
initial policy was that fishing licences could be transferred together with a vessel when it 
was sold and then licences from smaller vessels could subsequently be transferred to and 
aggregated in a larger vessel, so long as the total vessel capacity units of the overall fleet 
were not increased. 
Hamble owned a vessel, the Nellie, that could be, but had never been, used for 
beam trawling. In reliance on the Department’s policy Hamble purchased two smaller 
vessels with pressure stock beam trawl licences which it intended to transfer to the 
Nellie. However, the vessel capacity of the Nellie needed to be reduced before the 
transfer could take place. Hamble made enquiries with the Department regarding the 
transfer and aggregation of licences and explained its plans to the Department. 
 In March 1992, the Department then announced an immediate moratorium on the 
transfer and aggregation of pressure-stock licences onto beam trawlers fishing in the 
North Sea. It did so because the existing measures to protect pressure stocks in the North 
Sea had proven inadequate and the Department thus sought to restrict the entry of any 
new beam trawlers into the North Sea.  There were three exceptions to this policy that 
applied to (a) those with a prior record of beam-trawl fishing in the North Sea, (b) those 
who had already made applications for the transfer of such licences prior to the 
announcement of the moratorium and (c) those who had concluded certain types of 
binding contracts (and satisfied certain other requirements). 
 Hamble did not fall within any of the exceptions. Further, it was only after the 
intention to implement the moratorium was announced, that the vessel capacity units of 
the Nellie were reduced, and even then its capacity was still too high for the licences to 
be aggregated to it (as the capacity of the fleet would then have been increased contrary 
to the Department’s previous policy). Thus Hamble had to acquire a further vessel for 




the applicant had made an investment but was still a substantial way from fulfilling its 
terms. 
 Hamble accepted that the Department had the power to change its policy from 
time to time in the interests of conservation. However, it argued that where radical and 
severe measures such as a moratorium are imposed, the legitimate expectations of those 
who had already irrevocably entered into transactions at that time (by acquiring beam 
trawl pressure stock licences for aggregation and demonstrating a genuine intent to fish 
in the North Sea) should be protected by appropriate transitional provisions.  
 The Department defended its exclusion of individuals in the position of the 
applicant from the transitional provisions because on the evidence there were a large 
group of individuals in a similar position to Hamble. As such, if protection were 
afforded to this group it would seriously impede, if not completely undermine, the 
Department’s duty to monitor and control the intensity of fishing. 
Sedley J ultimately declined to order the substantive protection of Hamble’s 
expectations. First, he held that Hamble was distinguishable from the other categories 
for whom ‘transitional provision’ type exceptions had been made, since those classes 
had all the necessary entitlements or sufficient existing commitments to make it plainly 
unfair to frustrate them (and it was unnecessary to do so to achieve the aims of the new 
policy). Whereas, although Hamble had made an investment prior to the moratorium, its 
expectations were a long way from fulfilment ‘to the extent much was still in the realms 
of hope or planning’ (and in any event the investment would not be lost completely; at 
worst the value may have been reduced by the change in policy). He held that those 
falling within the pending application and binding-contracts exception represented a 
small and limited group, whereas the group in a similar position to Hamble, was large 
and open-ended. The Department was entitled to draw a line as tightly around the fleet 
of existing beam trawlers in the North Sea as could fairly be done to give effect to the 
objective of preserving pressure stocks. It could permissibly exclude the category of 
persons in the position of Hamble because by including them the purpose of the new 




Clearly, the main reason for the court declining to protect the expectation in this 
case is that such a wide class of people would potentially be entitled to the same 
protection that it would have undermined the legitimate government purpose if the 






The use of policies by government has become prevalent and these policies exert a 
significant influence over decision-making that affects individuals. The courts are in a 
constant dance with the administration over the right balance between flexibility and 
certainty, the attainment of public purposes and the need to treat individuals with 
respect.  To date, the courts have developed the fettering-by-rigidity principle which 
plays an important role in fostering participation and transparency in discretionary 
decisions governed by policy.  It has also, over time, been developed by courts so that it 
applies in a variable way that takes into account the important role that policy plays in 
shaping the exercise of administrative discretion. However the courts have not gone far 
enough in holding the administration accountable for how it applies policy. 
 At present the legal regulation of policy functions in an asymmetrical way such that 
the administration can hold individuals to their policies but individuals cannot similarly 
hold the administration to its policies. The right balance between flexibility and 
consistency has not been struck. The courts should develop the consistency principle 
and provide for the substantive protection of legitimate expectations, first, to guide 
administrators as to the considerations that should be taken into account in striking the 
appropriate balance and, second, to hold them accountable where the manner in which 
the power has been exercised does not accord with the vision of good government 
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